A Mind at War: Erga Paraloga in Thucydides\u27 History by Korf, Damon George
Bard College 
Bard Digital Commons 
Senior Projects Spring 2016 Bard Undergraduate Senior Projects 
Spring 2016 
A Mind at War: Erga Paraloga in Thucydides' History 
Damon George Korf 
Bard College, dk4429@bard.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2016 
 Part of the Ancient History, Greek and Roman through Late Antiquity Commons, Classical Literature 
and Philology Commons, International Relations Commons, Military History Commons, and the Political 
History Commons 
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 4.0 License. 
Recommended Citation 
Korf, Damon George, "A Mind at War: Erga Paraloga in Thucydides' History" (2016). Senior Projects Spring 
2016. 216. 
https://digitalcommons.bard.edu/senproj_s2016/216 
This Open Access work is protected by copyright and/or 
related rights. It has been provided to you by Bard 
College's Stevenson Library with permission from the 
rights-holder(s). You are free to use this work in any way 
that is permitted by the copyright and related rights. For 
other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-
holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by 
a Creative Commons license in the record and/or on the 
work itself. For more information, please contact 
digitalcommons@bard.edu. 
A Mind at War: 
 Erga Paraloga in Thucydides’ History 
 
Senior project submitted to  
The Division of Languages and Literature  
of Bard College 
by  
Damon Korf  
 
Annandale-on-Hudson, New York 
















Above all, I would like to thank my advisor, Professor Carolyn Dewald, for her invaluable 
guidance and support throughout this study of Thucydides. Your love for history is inspiring.  
 
I am also grateful to Professor Bill Mullen for a fruitful midyear discussion about the nature of 
my project.  
 
Finally, I would like to extend my gratitude to the entire Classics faculty for an incredible four 
years at Bard: Professors Diana Depardo-Minsky, Daniel Mendelsohn, Lauren Curtis, Jamie 
Romm, Jay Elliott, Rob Cioffi, Carolyn Dewald, and Bill Mullen—I can no longer imagine my 
life without these great works of art, and I have you all to thank for this gift.    
 
To my friends Ted, Eugene, Ramona, Luke, Jared, Alex, and Grace: you are brilliant human 
beings, and I am fortunate to know you. 
 
Jeremy Hall, Jared Hester, Jared Rabinowitz, and Jonas Kempf: thank you for your helping me 
format this project! 
 
















Introduction: Teaching and Learning……………………………………………………………1 
 
Chapter 1: Thucydidean Worldbuilding…………………………………………………………14 
 
The Archaeology: Establishing Patterns, Debunking Myths…………………………….14 
Epidamnus: Values Old and New………………………………………………………..19 
The Speeches at Athens: Interpretations of Justice………………………………………28 
The Corcyraean Speech………………………………………………………………….29 
The Corinthian Speech and the Athenian Verdict……………………………………….33 
Chapter 2: Seeing Double………………………………………………………………………..36 
Doublesight in Deed and Word: Sybota & the Athenian Speech at Sparta……………...36 
 
Potidaea: An Exposition on Political Friendship and Enmity…………………………...42 
 
Disadvantageous Advantages: Ta Sumphora Paraloga……………………………………..46 
Athens, The Hypnotic City………………………………………………………………49 
Chapter 3: Normalizing Atrocity………………………………………………………………...52 
 
An Analysis of Book 3’s Pre-Stasis Narrative Structure………………………………...53 
 
The Stasis on Corcyra……………………………………………………………………57 
 
a. 1 Corinthian Ship, 1 Athenian Ship……………………………………….......59 
 
b. 1 Athenian Ship………………………………………………………………..60 
c. No Ships in the Harbor………………………………………………………...62 
d. 1 Corinthian Ship……………………………………………………………...63 
Linguistic Kinêsis………………………………………………………………………...64 
A.1 Political Leaders in Peace and War………………………………………….65 
B. Human Nature & Stasis……………………………………………………….66 
A.2 Cities and Private Individuals in Peace and War……………………………66 
 
Conclusions………………………………………………………………………………67 

























Introduction: Teaching and Learning  
In antiquity, the poet was considered a teacher (Smertenko, 233). Even in the historical 
prose of Herodotus, a teaching figure appears early on in Book 1, Solon, whose lessons inform 
the outcome of the History’s events to a significant extent (Dewald, 9-26). Thucydides is 
different: no such articulate entity endorses a system of political action that befits circumstance, 
a system that the narrative confirms with concordant results. Instead of a wise man, it is the war 
itself that is the didaskalos, a biaios didaskalos (3.82.2), and it is from this war narrative, rather 
than a characterization of it by someone in the text, that the reader of Thucydides will learn.  
It is difficult to remember that behind the austere, impersonal narrative of the History, 
there was an Athenian citizen, a general no less, who wrote it. Thucydides reveals something of 
his authorial convictions in section 1.22, when he details the historical methodology involved in 
the composition of his work. Such deliberate emphasis of authorial presence and process is 
unparalleled elsewhere in ancient literature, with Arrian’s Anabasis being an “honorable 
exception” (Hornblower, 59 n. 22). As such, we have a brief glimpse of a corporeal Thucydides, 
kalamos in hand.  
Thucydides presents himself boldly. He believes that his work is superior to other 
histories because its subject matter is the greatest to date, and because his study of the subject 
matter is a zêtêsis alêtheias, a remarkable literary enterprise (1.20.3). Thucydides is confident 
and proud that his work will have everlasting importance because the hard facts and truths that it 
offers are useful, a claim of Thucydides’ that we will return to (1.22.4). Truth for Thucydides 
requires an understanding of war that is not heroic, as in the Iliad, but highly realistic: the biaios 
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didaskalos of the Peloponnesian War produced no glorious heroes, but leveled the spirit of 
humankind to baseness and necessity.  
In Chapter 21, Thucydides contextualizes these realist objectives within the history of 
Greek literature, going head-to-head with what he calls “the mythic” quality that pervades much 
of it. While the value of the truth may seem self-evident to a modern reader, it is worthwhile to 
pause and consider the nature of the truth that mattered to Thucydides. Thucydides introduces 
the concept of the truth in his discussion of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, whose glorification into 
civic heroes he believes was largely undeserved. Thucydides reveals that they killed Hipparchus 
in cold blood because they wanted “to perform some daring exploit.”1 The prevalence of this 
myth exemplifies the fact that “People are inclined to accept all stories of ancient times in an 
uncritical way—even when these stories concern their own native countries” (1.20*). As we will 
learn in reading Thucydides, people accept tales of the past indiscriminately especially if they are 
flattering and native to their own land.  
The quest for truth is arduous. Using his own historical efforts to illustrate this claim, 
Thucydides demonstrates this fact to his reader several times.2 He sets these painstaking probings 
against the trusting nature of the majority, whose quest for truth (if it could even be called such) 
is “not painstaking”:  
οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ ἑτοῖµα 
µᾶλλον τρέπονται. ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρηµένων τεκµηρίων ὅµως τοιαῦτα ἄν τις νοµίζων 
µάλιστα ἃ διῆλθον οὐχ ἁµαρτάνοι…  
                                                
1  All translations of Thucydides are my own with the exception of those marked with an asterisk 
(*), which are from Rex Warner’s translation. 
2 ...ἐπὶ µακρότατον σκοποῦντί (1.1); τὰ µὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ηὗρον, χαλεπὰ ὄντα παντὶ ἑξῆς 
τεκµηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι (1.20); χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαµνηµονεῦσαι ἦν 
ἐµοί (1.22); ἐπιπόνως δὲ ηὑρίσκετο (1.22.3). 
3 Although Thucydides seems to have successfully tested Homer’s claims in the Archaeology 2 ...ἐπὶ µακρότατον σκοποῦντί (1.1); τὰ µὲν οὖν παλαιὰ τοιαῦτα ηὗρον, χαλεπὰ ὄντα παντὶ ἑξῆς 
τεκµηρίῳ πιστεῦσαι (1.20); χαλεπὸν τὴν ἀκρίβειαν αὐτὴν τῶν λεχθέντων διαµνηµονεῦσαι ἦν 
ἐµοί (1.22); ἐπιπόνως δὲ ηὑρίσκετο (1.22.3). 
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For many, the quest for the truth is not painstaking; they are more inclined to turn 
toward what is readily available. But nevertheless, someone judging such things 
which I was going through by the aforementioned evidence would not err…  
        (1.21.4-5) 
 
In this passage, Thucydides distinguishes his intellectual rigor from that of the majority, who do 
not want make the effort to find the truth, and who accept the information that is at hand. 
Thucydides also asserts here that a reader heeding how he has presented historical information 
would share in the certitudes of his intellectual rigor. Thucydides transforms himself from 
investigator to author: once laboring to perceive the truth of matters, he now presents what he 
has found as the truth, and once having criticized how information is shared and processed, he 
must now validate why he should be trusted as a source of information about the Peloponnesian 
War. To do so, he elucidates important differences between his narrative and the narratives of 
poets and chroniclers by contrasting his composition style with theirs, explaining how each of 
these styles of composition and presentation impacts the reader (or listener) in different ways.   
Thucydides’ reader will be “judging” (νοµίζων) from evidence (ἐκ δὲ τῶν εἰρηµένων 
τεκµηρίων, 1.21.5) that he “wrote-up” (ξυνέγραψε, 1.1). By contrast, those who are reading the 
poets are not “judging,” but “trusting,” “trusting how the poets have sung about [the events of the 
past], arranging them toward something greater” (ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑµνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ µεῖζον 
κοσµοῦντες µᾶλλον πιστεύων), and trusting “how the chroniclers were putting them together in a 
form more appealing to the ear than as something truer” (ὡς λογογράφοι ξυνέθεσαν ἐπὶ τὸ 
προσαγωγότερον τῇ ἀκροάσει ἢ ἀληθέστερον), both types of narrative “being safe from being 
disproven and [much of their contents] being untrustworthy given their length of time, having 
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won for themselves mythic status”3 (ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως 
ἐπὶ τὸ µυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα, 1.21). In summation, those who incline toward poetry and 
chronicles are “trusting” because their judgment has been overwhelmed by the artistry of these 
narratives that appeal more to the ideals of the human spirit than the empirical facts of life. 
Because Thucydides assures his reader that the History is an unadorned factual compilation of 
the war, rather than a poetic “ordering” (1.21) of it, he cautions that it is accordingly less 
pleasurable, “The non-mythic [quality of my work] will perhaps appear less pleasurable to hear 
[than the works of the poets and chroniclers]” (καὶ ἐς µὲν ἀκρόασιν ἴσως τὸ µὴ µυθῶδες αὐτῶν 
ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται, 1.22.4).  
Since Thucydides is confident that a reader can “judge” information from τῶν εἰρηµένων 
τεκµηρίων (1.21.5), a methodology tailored to seek alêtheia (1.21.4), he believes that reading the 
History is a journey to knowledge through extreme narrative constraint. Thucydides’ doctrine not 
only governs the writing of the work, but attempts to govern its reading as well. Questionable as 
this logic may be, it is clear that Thucydides ultimately seeks to promote a new kind of 
intellectual freedom with his History. As a ktêma es aiei, a “possession for forever,” it will be 
useful for “those who are willing to perceive the truth of what has been, and what will be again” 
(1.22.4). The ktêma that is the History is democratic in its objectives, written with the individual 
in mind, given to us, his readers, as a tool to understand the past and the future alike. By contrast, 
Thucydides depicts the mythic works of other authors as self-interested, appealing to the public 
to bolster their stature, each acting as an agonisma es to parakhrêma (1.22.4). Of course, to 
characterize these other works as sell-outs only bolsters Thucydides’ literary appeal and his 
claim to intellectual rigor and profundity. Nevertheless, the distinction that Thucydides draws 
                                                
3 Although Thucydides seems to have successfully tested Homer’s claims in the Archaeology 
(1.1-20).  
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between ktêma, “possession” and khrêma, “use” or “want,” is both sincere and important. 
Rhetoric, as has been and always will be noted by readers of Thucydides, holds incredible sway 
over the vulnerable mind. The volatile Athenian democracy, in particular, was at the mercy of 
words and ideas that would influence them by speaking to their ambitious and exalted view of 
their state. Thucydides’ exposé of the myth of Harmodius and Aristogeiton points to this 
phenomenon: the story is loved because it validates and heroizes democracy and its ideals, not 
because it is true.  
Thucydides began recording the war “immediately at its onset,” expecting that “it would 
be great and more noteworthy than preceding wars” (ἀρξάµενος εὐθὺς καθισταµένου καὶ ἐλπίσας 
µέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενηµένων, 1.1). Truly, the History, a steady 
stream of events and factual reporting with limited didactic analyses from the author himself, is 
often designed to read like a transcript of these events.4 This narrative is both objective, 
reflecting Thucydides’ philosophy of historical reporting, and experiential, reflecting his 
participatory status in the war. As Hornblower puts it, Thucydides “sat down to record a set of 
events which were still in the future” (Hornblower, 5), an altogether new phenomenon. In this 
way, the History features a “homology between the reader’s experience and that of participants 
in the war,”5 one initially shared by Thucydides himself as an Athenian general. Thucydides 
would later be exiled from Athens for 20 years because of a military failure at Amphipolis, 
during which time he was at leisure to research and continue to write the History, a fact that he 
states at 5.26.  
To consider Thucydides’ experience as an exiled Athenian general is of the utmost 
importance in understanding the composition of the History. In its opening chapter, Thucydides 
                                                
4 There are notable digressions, such the myth as the Pentekontaetia (1.89-117), the stories of 
Pausanias and Themistocles (1.128-138), and of Harmodius and Aristogeiton (6.54-9). 
5 Tim Rood, “Thucydides: Narrative and Explanation,” 22, citing Connor (1991), 58. 
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refers to himself as an “examiner,” a “viewer,” a skopôn.6 In doing so, Thucydides is subtly 
asserting the sense of sight that he employed in the composition of his History, having lived 
through this time as an Athenian citizen, and a general on the front lines. The historian expounds 
upon his role as skopôn here:  
τὰ δ᾽ ἔργα τῶν πραχθέντων ἐν τῷ πολέµῳ οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος 
πυνθανόµενος ἠξίωσα γράφειν, οὐδ᾽ ὡς ἐµοὶ ἐδόκει, ἀλλ᾽ οἷς τε αὐτὸς παρῆν καὶ 
παρὰ τῶν ἄλλων ὅσον δυνατὸν ἀκριβείᾳ περὶ ἑκάστου ἐπεξελθών. ἐπιπόνως δὲ 
ηὑρίσκετο, διότι οἱ παρόντες τοῖς ἔργοις ἑκάστοις οὐ ταὐτὰ περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν 
ἔλεγον, ἀλλ᾽ ὡς ἑκατέρων τις εὐνοίας ἢ µνήµης ἔχοι.    
 
And as for the deeds of events in the war—I did not deem them worthy to write 
down as I learned them from anybody who happened to be standing around, nor 
as it seemed to me, but at events in which I myself was present or from other 
eyewitnesses, cross-examining information about each deed with as much 
precision as possible. And the deeds of the war have been discovered with great 
difficulty, because those who were present at each event were not saying the same 
thing about it, but as one would speak from bias or recollection. 
        (1.22.3) 
 
Here, Thucydides tells us that he did not write the History based on information that he heard 
from ordinary folk whom he happened to bump into on his travels. He only it deemed worthy to 
write accounts of deeds that he had witnessed with his own eyes, or from accounts of other 
eyewitnesses whom he interviewed. Even when Thucydides has to conduct an interview to 
obtain information for his History, we can tell that he is observing his subjects carefully to 
determine when they are speaking from eunoia or mnêmê: facial expressions, body language, 
verbal cadence, and the words of the speakers themselves are all being considered. Thus, even in 
interviews, Thucydides is fully “present” (αὐτός παρῆν) as a watcher, a skopôn.  
                                                
6 … ἐκ δὲ τεκµηρίων ὧν ἐπὶ µακρότατον σκοποῦντί µοι πιστεῦσαι ξυµβαίνει… (1.1.3).   
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Thucydides refers to readers of the History as skopountes;7 this makes his imagined 
audience distinct from the audiences of other literary genres who are, in Thucydides’ estimation, 
“trusters,” pisteuontes.8 What does it mean, then, for Thucydides, a skopôn, to class us, his 
readers, as kindred skopountes?  
I would like to begin to answer this question with a quote from Lowell Edmunds’ book 
Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides: “In the History,” he writes “the actors and speakers 
experience only some one arc of the cycle, whereas experience reflected in the History is a whole 
cycle” (203).9 Thus, while Thucydides’ historical actors are confined to their individual 
perspectives of the war, Edmunds argues that Thucydides’ History gives us a complete 
perspective, a full spectrum, of the war.   
I would like to direct Edmunds’ comments toward the thematic and structural dichotomy 
of logoi and erga in the History, one that has been noted by many scholars of Thucydides, and by 
the historian himself when he tells us about the two different methods he employed to compose 
speeches and deeds in the History (1.22). It is, I would argue, Thucydides’ very presentation of 
                                                
7 καὶ ὁ πόλεµος οὗτος, καίπερ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐν ᾧ µὲν ἂν πολεµῶσι τὸν παρόντα αἰεὶ µέγιστον 
κρινόντων, παυσαµένων δὲ τὰ ἀρχαῖα µᾶλλον θαυµαζόντων, ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν τῶν ἔργων σκοποῦσι 
δηλώσει ὅµως µείζων γεγενηµένος αὐτῶν (1.21.2); ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενοµένων τὸ 
σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν µελλόντων ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων 
ἔσεσθαι… (1.22).  
8 Audiences of other genres: ὡς ποιηταὶ ὑµνήκασι περὶ αὐτῶν ἐπὶ τὸ µεῖζον κοσµοῦντες µᾶλλον 
πιστεύων (1.21). It could be argued that Thucydides simply refers his audience as skopoi 
because he imagines that they will be reading or “looking” at a physical copy of the History, 
rather than having it read to them. I believe, however, that we will find this interpretation 
needlessly limiting as we proceed through our study, especially when we discuss the 
Archaeology, which begins with phainô as well.  When Thucydides writes, for example that “My 
work will appear less pleasurable to hear” (καὶ ἐς µὲν ἀκρόασιν … ἀτερπέστερον φανεῖται, 
1.22.4), we are confounded because we are presented with a conflation of senses: sight (phainô) 
and hearing (akroasis). The experience of encountering the History is, in a sense, synesthetic. As 
we proceed through our analysis, the meaning of Thucydides’ “synesthetic” approach to history 
will be unfolded. 
9 Edmunds is making this assertion from a study of Aristotle’s Problemata, from which he 
argues that “Human ignorance is… an objective condition.” 
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erga alongside logoi in the History that completes the “cycle” of knowledge that historical actors 
of the History do not have. Take, for example, Thucydides’ analysis of the cause of the 
Peloponnesian War: “What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear 
which this caused in Sparta” (1.23*). Thucydides describes the Peloponnesian War as something 
“brought to necessity” (ἀναγκάσαι ἐς τὸ πολεµεῖν) because the incomplete knowledge that each 
nation had of the other led to deep political mistrust and diplomatic irreconcilability; each side 
was compelled to trust their own calculations (logismoi) about the other’s intent.  
 To Sparta, the ultimate imperial intents and machinations of the Athenians are unknown; 
it is this fear of the unknown that pushes them toward war. So too, the Athenian uncertainty of 
the Peloponnesians’ ultimate intents and machinations causes them to take measures to 
consolidate their empire, measures that only make the Peloponnesians more frightened.10 
Thucydides shows us how the respective half-cycles of knowledge on the Athenian and Spartan 
side brought about the war that they feared and, in this way, completes the cycle of our 
knowledge regarding the cause of the Peloponnesian War.  
In Book 1, the Athenian envoys at Sparta warn the assembled Peloponnesians that a 
significant portion of war is paralogos. This word, in its nominal form, means, “that which is 
beyond all calculation,” and in its adjectival form, “beyond calculation,” “unexpected,” or 
“unaccountable” (LSJ, 524). It is ironic that the Athenians should, in this particular speech, 
characterize war in this way. These Athenians, Thucydides tells us, had intended to placate the 
                                                
10 The fear between Sparta and Athens goes back to the Athenian construction of their Long 
Walls, which Thucydides details in the Pentekontaetia (1.89-93). The Spartans fear that the 
construction of the walls will grant Athens too much power and ask that the Athenians 
reconsider their plans. Themistocles, believing that the Spartan will secure by force what they 
cannot secure by policy, goes to Sparta to stall them until the Athenians have constructed the 
walls. Once the walls are built, Themistocles tells the Spartans what has transpired, and justifies 
it with nationalistic praise of Athenian heroism during the Persian War. “After listening to this, 
the Spartans showed no open signs of displeasure towards Athens” (1.92*).     
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Peloponnesians with their speech, “In this way they hoped to divert their audience from the idea 
of war and make them incline toward letting matters rest” (1.72*). Yet their speech, as my 
second chapter examines in greater detail, achieves the opposite of its intended result: having 
heard it, the Spartans grow even more agitated with the Athenians, decree that the Athenians 
have, in fact, broken the peace treaties, and take further steps toward declaring war against 
Athens (1.86-8).  
How, then, could these Athenian envoys have so utterly misjudged the effect that their 
speech would have on the Peloponnesians? They knew full well that the Peloponnesians were 
weary of hearing their nationalistic speeches, yet they deliver a nationalistic speech nonetheless, 
“...we must (ἀνάγκη λέγειν) refer to the Persian War, to events known to you all, even though 
you may be tired of constantly hearing the story” (1.73*). The word ἀνάγκη is important here 
because suggests that the Athenians are bound to deliver this nationalistic speech knowing that it 
would annoy their audience. But the Athenians refuse to establish a causal relationship between 
their repeated deliverance of nationalistic speeches and the growing resentment of the Greeks 
toward Athens: this is because they live imaginatively in their imperial ideal, an ideal that exists 
independently of their current political reality. As such, the Athenians, for all their ingenuity, fail 
to adapt their rhetoric to placate an increasingly anti-Athenian Greece. 
I believe that the Athenian envoys’ behavior at the Spartan assembly is a product of what 
Thucydides will later call an autokratôr logismos in a bold sociological proclamation about the 
nature of humankind:  
εἰωθότες οἱ ἄνθρωποι οὗ µὲν ἐπιθυµοῦσιν ἐλπίδι ἀπερισκέπτῳ διδόναι, ὃ δὲ µὴ 
προσίενται λογισµῷ αὐτοκράτορι διωθεῖσθαι. 
 
Men are accustomed to give what they want to untested/blind hope, but that which 




That which man wants he puts in the hands of hope, blindly (aperiskeptos) and without 
calculation. But that which man does not want, he dismisses by creating a system of logic 
(logismos) unchecked by reality (erga). Metaphorically speaking, this logic is autocratic 
(autokratôr).  
The autokratôr logismos11 of the Athenians proved to be a bitter reality for Thucydides 
and his fellow generals to cope with. In the History, we often see Athenian generals saddled with 
difficult orders from the Athenians, and fearing the consequences of failure. Our first example of 
this will be in Chapter 2, when we study the fear that the Athenian generals experience at Sybota, 
having been placed in the catch-22 position of following Athenian orders and most certainly 
failing in their mission, or disobeying orders and having a better chance at success (1.45-55). 
Should a general fail to meet the Athenians’ expectations, their wrath was harsh. At the end of 
the Peloponnesian War in 406, past the time when Thucydides was still writing the History, “the 
eight stratêgoi who commanded the fleet at Arginusae were all removed from office and 
condemned to death” (OCD, 1406, “Stratêgoi”). Although the generals had led the Athenians to 
victory, this was “marred by the failure to pick up survivors from their crippled ships, when a 
storm arose” (OCD, 148, “Arginusae”).  
This project examines Thucydides’ presentation of autocratic reasoning in the 
Peloponnesian War. We will primarily study the autocratic reasoning of the Athenians with 
regard to their empire, and the autocratic reasoning of Hellenic staseis with regard to the 
meaning of nomoi. In the case of the Athenians, we will see how autocratic reasoning proves 
detrimental to their imperial ambitions in a paralogos polemos. In the case of the Hellenic 
                                                
11 When I do translate this term, I will translate it as “autocratic reasoning,” autocratic in the 
sense that such a reasoning is formed and exists independently of objective facts.  
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staseis, we will see an extremely violent manifestation of autocratic reasoning that justifies what 
are, in actuality, vices and, accordingly, vilifies virtues. I call this phenomenon linguistic kinêsis. 
Finally, we will consider how the History, in presenting logoi and erga side by side, controverts 
the process by which the self-justificatory narratives produced by autocratic reasoning become 
unchallengeable; such narratives about the Peloponnesian War could have been codified into 
history had the History not been written.  
This project is largely conducted in the chronological order in which Thucydides presents 
his history of the Peloponnesian War. Chapter 1 begins with a study of the Archaeology (1.2-19) 
and demonstrates how Thucydides challenges the historicity of “unchallengeable”12 Homeric 
logoi by writing-up, from a realist perspective, the erga that correspond to (and undermine the 
veracity of) what had come to be accepted as the heroic past. Thucydides’ challenging of the 
Homeric logoi provides a model for how proper historical inquiry should be conducted. It also 
provides a sociopolitical framework through which to view the events of the Peloponnesian War, 
an essential sociopolitical truth that “…material relations—who is more powerful and controls 
resources—shape social relations” (Crane, 174).  
Proceeding from the Archaeology to the Epidamnian narrative (1.24-30), I examine how 
Thucydides subtly shows that the sociology of 5th-century Greece remains fundamentally the 
same as that of the prehistoric times that he had analyzed in the Archaeology—only now, 
however, ethical principles are used to legitimize and further political agendas. The chapter 
concludes with a look at the speeches delivered at the Athenian ecclêsia (1.31-45), where I 
examine how the Corcyraeans and the Athenians rhetorically manipulate the principle of justice 
to suit their own national interests. From the Archaeology to the Athenian ecclêsia, Thucydides 
                                                
12 ὄντα ἀνεξέλεγκτα καὶ τὰ πολλὰ ὑπὸ χρόνου αὐτῶν ἀπίστως ἐπὶ τὸ µυθῶδες ἐκνενικηκότα 
(1.21).  
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demonstrates that material relations shape social relations, and it is this fundamental sociological 
precept that is to be weighed against the ideals that autocratic reasoning projects.  
Chapter 2 transitions from Thucydides’ geopolitical analysis of self-interest in the 
Epidamnian narrative to the national perspectives of the Athenians, Peloponnesians, and 
Thracians as the crisis of war looms over Greece. The Athenians fail to understand the 
connection between their material ambition and their social relations with other Greek states. 
This fact will be demonstrated by comparing the intents of their diplomatic strategies employed 
at Sybota (1.44-55), Sparta (1.72-8), and Potidaea (1.56-65) to the negative reactions that such 
strategies receive from the Peloponnesians and the Thracians. For these parties, it is Athens’ 
material relations to the Greek world, rather than their magnanimous democratic ideals, that 
shape their social relations to Athens: what the Athenians believe is the just defense of their 
empire, others perceive as an aggressive and overreaching tyranny.13 By viewing the state of 
political affairs through their own nationalist narrative, and making decisions based on this 
flawed understanding, the Athenians unwittingly further degrade their public image and make 
disadvantageous decisions believing them to be advantageous.   
Chapter 3 begins with a broad examination of the effect that war, a biaios didaskalos, has 
on the political ideals of Athens and Sparta. The first half of the chapter demonstrates that the 
necessities of war inhibit them from implementing on the battlefield the national ideals that they 
had proclaimed in Book 1 (3.1-3.69). The second half of this chapter demonstrates a correlation 
between the increasing devastation that war brings to Greece and the rise in violent idealism 
within cities that results in the eruption of Hellenic staseis (3.82-5). Within the civic space of 
Greek cities, the rhetorical finesse of politicians corrupts traditional Hellenic nomoi, and 
                                                
13 Cleon himself warns the Athenians: “What you do not realize is that your empire is a tyranny 
exercised over subjects who do not like it and who are always plotting against” (3.37*).  
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internecine warfare becomes justified. It is in Book 3 that Thucydides shows most clearly how 
logoi prevail over erga—the biaios didaskalos has not only taught the Greeks to commit acts of 





















Chapter 1: Thucydidean Worldbuilding  
Introduction: 
This chapter begins with a study of the principles of sociopolitical development presented 
in the Archaeology (1.2-19): self-interest and the rule of the strong. It proceeds to examine how 
these sociopolitical principles exist and operate in first diplomatic altercation in the History: the 
dispute over Epidamnus between Corinth and Corcyra (1.24-30). It concludes with a look at how 
these sociopolitical principles can be masked with rhetoric in the first set of speeches in the 
History (1.31-45).  
The Archaeology: Establishing Patterns, Debunking Myths (1.2-19) 
The Archaeology is, on the one hand, a selling point for Thucydides’ History. In the 
Archaeology, Thucydides argues that wars fought before the Peloponnesian War did not match 
its “greatness” (1.1): the Trojan War did not match its greatness because the parties involved 
lacked material resources (1.11-12), and the Persian War because it was decided relatively 
quickly (1.23). Later handbooks of rhetoric would call this comparative technique, which 
Thucydides employs here, an auxêsis (Hornblower, 3). But the Archaeology’s rhetorical 
quality—its quantitative deflation of past wars—is really a foil for its qualitative deflation of 
Greek mythohistory: while the traditions of ritual and religion seen in the poems of Homer and 
Hesiod would characterize any Greek’s conception of the past, Thucydides sees a past that is not 
governed by epic nomoi, but by principles of dunamis, dunamis that is not acquired by words, 
oaths, religion, and ritual, but by asserting power over others and subduing them.  
I say that Thucydides “sees” a past because phainô is the verb that Thucydides uses to 
introduce the Archaeology (1.2). By using this verb of illumination, the historian is expressing a 
visual rather than an aural connection to the past. Thucydides believed that human events 
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resemble one another (1.22.4), and that human nature remains the same (3.82). Recognizing in 
his lifetime that principles of dunamis governed the world, rather than ethical concerns, 
Thucydides saw no reason why the Homeric past should have been any different, despite what 
songs of the ancient poets portrayed. In this way, Thucydides had not just heard the logoi of the 
epic past, but, in a sense, had actually “seen” the past itself.  
The most important function of the Archaeology is to provide a sociopolitical framework 
of dunamis through which to view the events of the Peloponnesian War. So too, by beginning the 
History with an interrogation of the most widespread and compelling Hellenic logoi, Thucydides 
encourages his reader to interrogate the logoi presented within the History as well.    
The Archaeology begins with a vision of prehistoric Greek society: there were cycles of 
population migrations caused by raids of nomadic hunter-gatherers, a constant flux of people 
“being under the constant pressure of invaders who were stronger than they were” (1.2*). 
Thucydides’ description of prehistoric nomadism introduces to the History the concept that the 
weak are subject to the strong, a rhetorical refrain of speeches delivered in the History.14 This 
rhetorical claim is validated by the Archaeology, which presents the rule of the strong as a 
timeless truth underlying society.  
The process of migrations was constant and unrelenting; the inevitability that stronger 
raiders would overcome weaker settlers created a destructive vortex in which a growing society 
established in a fertile land would be all the more subject to attack and destruction (1.2). Attica is 
the exception to this paradeigma on account of its poor soil, and Athens in particular rises to 
                                                
14 Two examples of this are the Athenian envoys at Sparta: “It has always been a rule that the 
weak should be subject to the strong” (1.76*), and the Athenians in Melos: “This is the safe rule 
— to stand up to one’s equals, to behave with deference toward one’s superiors, and to treat 
inferiors with moderation” (5.111*). 
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power by accepting the powerful exiles from newly-destroyed wealthy cities, without suffering 
from raids themselves (1.2-6).  
Thucydides’ analysis of Athens’ rise to power is his most myth-like interpretation in the 
Archaeology: that welcoming refugees and safety from attacks due to poor soil should result in 
power and colonization is rather too schematic—magical, even—to be fully compelling. 
Furthermore, this Athenian vignette is mythical in that it evokes the literary tradition that Athens 
had always been a sanctuary for the oppressed. Nevertheless, Thucydides establishes Athens as 
the first bastion of strength and stability in the prehistoric Hellenic world, the archê of power.  
Thucydides proceeds from this global perspective to Minos specifically. This king was, 
“according to tradition, the first person to organize a navy,” and is, therefore, Thucydides’ first 
person of interest (1.4). Naval power, the dominant refrain of the Archaeology, “played so large 
a part in the rise of Athens as an imperial power, and in the actual course of the Peloponnesian 
War” (Hornblower, 3). Focal figures of the Archaeology, like Minos, all wield naval power; 
these figures do not simply thematically prefigure the importance of sea power in the 
Peloponnesian War, but also show how they wielded it and for what reasons. 
Minos instated his sons as governors of the Cyclades, “having driven out the Carians.” 
He also drove out the pirates of the region and, Thucydides writes, “it is reasonable to suppose 
that he did his best [to do so] in order to secure his own revenues” (1.4*). As if to answer the 
question —“why else would Minos put down piracy except to secure his own revenues?”— 
Thucydides examines the societal position of the pirate in the prehistoric world.  
The profession of piracy arose from the advent of shipbuilding, and was practiced by 
Hellenes and barbarians alike. These pirates  
were powerful men, acting both out of self-interest and in order to support the 
weak among their own people… they would descend upon cities which were 
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unprotected by walls… and by plundering such places they would gain the most 
of their livelihood.  
 
ἡγουµένων ἀνδρῶν οὐ τῶν ἀδυνατωτάτων κέρδους τοῦ σφετέρου αὐτῶν ἕνεκα 
καὶ τοῖς ἀσθενέσι τροφῆς προσπίπτοντες πόλεσιν ἀτειχίστοις…ἥρπαζον καὶ τὸν 
πλεῖστον τοῦ βίου ἐντεῦθεν ἐποιοῦντο.  
(1.5*) 
These men were the nautical equivalents of the land raiders whom we saw earlier at 1.2: both 
make a living by plundering the weaker. “At this time,” Thucydides tells us, “such a profession, 
so far from being regarded as disgraceful, was considered quite honorable” (οὐκ ἔχοντός πω 
αἰσχύνην τούτου τοῦ ἔργου, φέροντος δέ τι καὶ δόξης µᾶλλον, 1.5*). This sentence is quite 
important; it shows that in this time of bare essentials, to fight for survival to the fullest extent by 
overpowering the weaker was “not yet” (οὐκ πω) called “shameful,” but was a legitimate, and 
even honorable profession. When the pirates were asked by ancient poets, and even certain 
coastal dwellers in Thucydides’ own times, what they did for a living, they “would not shrink 
from admitting the fact [of their profession]” because the rule of the strong was a social norm, 
and there was no need for dissimilation (οὔτε … ἀπαξιούντων τὸ ἔργον, 1.5*). As such, it 
becomes clear that Minos did not put down piracy out of any principle of morality.15  
 Thucydides’ analytic focus on the rule of the strong culminates in his retelling of the 
Trojan expedition, a poetic universe central to Greek life: 
Agamemnon, it seems to me, must have been the most powerful of rulers of his 
day (δυνάµει προύχων); and it was for this reason that he raised the force against 
Troy, not because the suitors of Helen were bound to him by the oaths which they 
had sworn to Tyndareus. 
(1.9*) 
                                                
15 The unapologetic societal position of the pirate serves as a countermodel to frequent attempts 
to cloak “unflattering” erga with noble logos throughout the Peloponnesian War. Corcyra’s 
attempt to frame their self-interested actions as though they were in accordance with dikê will be 
our first real-time example of this (1.32).   
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Thucydides not only states that Agamemnon mustered his army by power, but also emphatically 
denies that the army voluntarily coalesced because of the oaths that they had sworn. “In my 
opinion,” he continues, “fear played a greater part than loyalty in the raising of the expedition 
against Troy” (µοι δοκεῖ Ἀγαµέµνων … τὴν στρατείαν οὐ χάριτι τὸ πλέον ἢ φόβῳ ξυναγαγὼν, 
1.9*). The weaker suitors are serving the stronger Agamemnon because they fear his power, not 
out of any moral principle. Indeed the Archaeology asserts that voluntary servitude was never 
ethical in prehistoric times, but always done for the sake of profit: “the weaker, desiring profit, 
were submitting themselves to the slavery of the stronger, whereas the stronger, having an 
abundance of wealth, were making weaker cities their subjects” (ἐφιέµενοι γὰρ τῶν κερδῶν οἵ τε 
ἥσσους ὑπέµενον τὴν τῶν κρεισσόνων δουλείαν, οἵ τε δυνατώτεροι περιουσίας ἔχοντες 
προσεποιοῦντο ὑπηκόους τὰς ἐλάσσους πόλεις, 1.8.3). That the Trojan expedition was a product 
of coercion rather than a voluntary effort reflects subtlety, but ironically, on the Hellenic world 
and, more specifically, the self-flattering rhetoric of imperial powers.  
In addition to challenging literary representations of the past in the Archaeology, 
Thucydides also conceives of a time when the architectural remains of Athens and Sparta would 
inaccurately reflect each civilization’s actual power to a future observer (1.10). Like the oaths 
sworn to Agamemnon in the poetic tradition, the aesthetic of cities reflect cultural values and 
practices that are at a remove from sociopolitical principles of material strength that allow for 
survival.  
The Archaeology shows us that appearances deceive. That the powers of Athens and 
Sparta could not be accurately gleaned from each city’s architectural aesthetic is one such 
example of this. Another is Thucydides’ emphasis on sea power. The Archaeology chronicles 
“the greatest navies of the past,” all of which are implicated as dominant forces in the dynamic of 
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the weak and strong (1.14): Minos (1.4), Agamemnon (1.9), the Corinthians, the Ionians, 
Polycrates, the Phocaeans (1.13), a model in which the Athenians are placed, “[Sparta was] 
supreme on land, [Athens] on sea” (1.18*). The Archaeology creates an expectation, therefore, 
that because the Athenians follow in this tradition of naval supremacy, they too will be victorious 
in the Peloponnesian War. Yet, as an ancient reader would know, feeling the barb of irony, or a 
future reader, for whom the History is really intended, would learn, Gylippus the Spartan general 
and the innovative Syracusans would stunningly defeat the Athenian navy in the battle in the 
Great Harbor of Sicily (7.70), a defeat that precipitated the end of the Athenian empire. Thus, 
even the Archaeology, a section of the History devoted to deconstructing appearances, deceives 
us by situating Athens in the tradition of Hellenic naval power.  
The truths that the Archaeology professes to reveal16 about the origins of Hellenic life 
may be summarized briskly as follows: the prehistoric world was unabashedly governed by the 
rule of the stronger—oaths, charis, and ethics were irrelevant. We will see to what extent these 
sociological principles apply to the events of the Peloponnesian War as recorded by Thucydides.  
Epidamnus: Values Old and New (1.24-30) 
Epidamnus’ vivid, present-tense introduction, “Epidamnus is a city…” (Ἐπίδαµνός ἐστι 
πόλις, 1.24), marks the transition from the Archaeology’s method of abstract historical analysis 
to a narrative of real-time current events; the History now commences its ongoing plot.  
The prehistoric world that Thucydides had presented in the Archaeology seems to have 
advanced: contemporary society has managed to disavow the simple and accepted harshness of 
ancient times—now, the ideas of right and wrong seem to matter. Beginning with Epidamnus, 
Thucydides begins to show how the dominant themes of the Archaeology—self-interest, the 
                                                
16 Thucydides asserts: “I do not think that one will be far wrong in accepting the conclusions I 
have reached from the evidence which I have put forward. It is better evidence than that of the 
poets…” (1.21*).  
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pursuit of power, and the rule of the strong—exist and operate within the more complex material 
and ideological framework of 5th-century Greece.  
A few years before the onset of the Peloponnesian War, the Epidamnian dêmos exile their 
city’s oligarchs, unhappy with the way that they had been ruling their impoverished city. These 
oligarchic exiles subsequently besiege Epidamnus with the aid of neighbouring Taulantian 
barbarians, and the dêmos find themselves hard-pressed for survival. Fearing for their lives, they 
send an embassy to Corcyra, “seeing as it was their mother-city” (ὡς µητρόπολιν οὖσαν, 1.24.6). 
This ὡς clause illustrates the logic and motive of these democrats: seeking aid from their 
metropolis is the proper measure to take, given the circumstances. Corcyra rejects their appeal, 
however, a decision that Thucydides does not comment on in his authorial voice. That the 
metropolis would show no investment in its own colony’s well-being is left puzzling and 
unexplained to the reader.   
Despite Thucydides’ analytic reticence, the historian emphasizes the pathos of the 
democratic appeal by depicting it in greater detail than many of the surrounding events recorded 
in the Epidamnian narrative; accordingly, it becomes a focal point of this first section of the 
History. The Epidamnians, Thucydides writes, came to Corcyra “begging that the Corcyraeans 
not oversee their destruction… [begging] them to reconcile the exiles to themselves, and put 
down the war with the barbarians ” (δεόµενοι µὴ σφᾶς περιορᾶν φθειροµένους… τούς τε 
φεύγοντας ξυναλλάξαι σφίσι καὶ τὸν τῶν βαρβάρων πόλεµον καταλῦσαι). He closes his account 
of the supplication with a careful depiction of the suppliants seated in the temple of Hera; 
deomai, the verb of supplication that introduced the scene as a participle, emphatically closes the 
sentence in the indicative: “These things they begged, sitting as suppliants in the temple of Hera” 
(ταῦτα δὲ ἱκέται καθεζόµενοι ἐς τὸ Ἥραιον ἐδέοντο, 1.24.7). Even without the addition of 
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Thucydides’ authorial voice, the extended image is quite charged and speaks for itself: the 
democrats are a pious people in a state of fear, and willing to come to an agreement. 
Furthermore, their request —that the Corcyraeans reconcile and mitigate this conflict as 
Epidamnus’ metropolis—is not unreasonable: no favoritism is requested, only authoritative 
arbitration.   
Corcyra’s dismissal imposes on the democrats a feeling of aporia:  
 γνόντες δὲ οἱ Ἐπιδάµνιοι οὐδεµίαν σφίσιν ἀπὸ Κερκύρας τιµωρίαν οὖσαν ἐν 
ἀπόρῳ εἴχοντο θέσθαι τὸ παρόν, καὶ πέµψαντες ἐς Δελφοὺς τὸν θεὸν ἐπήροντο εἰ 
παραδοῖεν Κορινθίοις τὴν πόλιν…  
  
Recognizing that there would be no help to them from Corcyra, the Epidamnians 
were at a loss to resolve their present circumstance, and having sent an envoy to 




Aporia is the term that Thucydides uses to express the democrats’ feeling of confoundment after 
their metropolis forsakes them. Supplication was “the most sacred of Greek appeals” (Connor, 
34-5 n.33), yet the Epidamnian democrats have received only a curt dismissal from the 
Corcyraeans.17 Connor’s important observation that there is a “homology between the reader’s 
experience and that of participants in the war” is one that is first felt here (Rood, 22 citing 
Connor, 58): the readers share in the democrats’ aporia because a shared ethical assumption of 
proper colonial conduct suggested by the ὡς clause (1.24.6) proves invalid (1.25). Like the 
participants in the war, readers of Thucydides will have to adjust to this new and shocking 
sociopolitical climate. 
                                                
17 For this reason among others, Connor is convinced that Corcyra’s “conduct… had been 
outrageous” (Connor, 34-5 n.33).  
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Now the democrats, in a state of desperation, turn to the Delphic oracle, who advises 
them to seek help from Corinth (1.25). It is important to pause here and note that the historian 
has begun his history of the Peloponnesian War through the lens of tradition and religion, a lens 
notably absent in the Archaeology. Thucydides is presenting the ability of traditional18 and 
religious practices to effect change in the world of 5th-century politics, and aporia marks the 
recognition of their first failure to do so. 
When the Epidamnian envoy arrives at Corinth from Delphi to plead their case (1.25.2), 
Thucydides begins to explore the different value system and political outlooks of Corinth and 
Corcyra. His description of Corinth’s motivations to assist the democrats begins this process: 
Κορίνθιοι δὲ κατά τε τὸ δίκαιον ὑπεδέξαντο τὴν τιµωρίαν, νοµίζοντες οὐχ ἧσσον 
ἑαυτῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν ἢ Κερκυραίων, ἅµα δὲ καὶ µίσει τῶν Κερκυραίων, ὅτι 
αὐτῶν παρηµέλουν ὄντες ἄποικοι. 
 
The Corinthians both accepted their appeal in accordance with justice, judging 
that the colony was no less their own than the Corcyraeans, and at the same time, 




The Corinthians agree to assist the Epidamnians for two reasons: they believe that they are acting 
in accordance with to dikaion by helping the besieged Epidamnians, and they have a prior civic 
grudge against Corcyra. Κατά τε τὸ δίκαιον is the first mention of dikê in the war narrative and, 
since it is an important political and ethical term, it ought to be interrogated: why do the 
Corinthians believe that it is just for them to help the democrats, and what does this say about the 
Corcyraeans’ refusal to help them?  
The writings of Connor and de Ste. Croix on this portion of the narrative provide a useful 
framework through which to view the question of justice in Epidamnus’ sociopolitical dilemma. 
                                                
18 Certainly, the Archaeology calls into question whether “tradition,” as the Greeks knew it from 
Homer, ever existed at all.  
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Connor believes that when Delphi sanctioned the Epidamnian democrats’ appeal to Corinth, she 
“thereby implicitly criticized Corcyra’s conduct” (Connor, 34-5 n.33). de St. Croix, however, 
takes a skeptical view to the Delphic oracle’s credibility: “In accordance with the common 
practice, [the Epidamnians] gave a strong hint of the advice they would like to receive, and they 
duly received it: they were to ‘hand themselves over to Corinth and accept her leadership” (de 
Ste. Croix, 68). Even if de St. Croix’s view is correct, the oracle’s potential lack of principle 
cannot cast definitive doubt upon the credibility of how the Corinthians viewed the oracle’s 
religious authority. Putting this matter aside for now, let us examine further Thucydides’ 
presentation of the Corinthians’ motivations to help Epidamnian democrats: 
οὔτε γὰρ ἐν πανηγύρεσι ταῖς κοιναῖς διδόντες γέρα τὰ νοµιζόµενα οὔτε Κορινθίῳ 
ἀνδρὶ προκαταρχόµενοι τῶν ἱερῶν ὥσπερ αἱ ἄλλαι ἀποικίαι, περιφρονοῦντες δὲ 
αὐτοὺς καὶ χρηµάτων δυνάµει ὄντες κατ᾽ ἐκεῖνον τὸν χρόνον ὁµοῖα τοῖς Ἑλλήνων 
πλουσιωτάτοις καὶ τῇ ἐς πόλεµον παρασκευῇ δυνατώτεροι, ναυτικῷ δὲ καὶ πολὺ 
προύχειν ἔστιν ὅτε ἐπαιρόµενοι καὶ κατὰ τὴν Φαιάκων προενοίκησιν τῆς 
Κερκύρας κλέος ἐχόντων τὰ περὶ τὰς ναῦς.    
 
Unlike their other colonies, the Corcyraeans did not give to Corinthians the usual 
right and honours at public festivals or allow them the correct facilities for 
making sacrifices. Instead they looked down upon their mother city, claiming that 
their financial power at this time made them equal with the richest states in Hellas 
and that their military resources were greater than those of Corinth. In particular 
they boasted of their naval superiority, sometimes even basing this claim on the 
ground that those famous sailors the Phaeacians had inhabited Corcyra before 
them. 
        (1.25.4*) 
 
Here, the verb nomizô describes the customary nature of the gifts that Corinthians would 
receive from their apoikiai as a metropolis in panhellenic festivals. Nomizô was also the verb that 
Thucydides had used to express the Corinthians’ belief that they had no less a right to Epidamnus 
as a colony than did Corcyra (...νοµίζοντες οὐχ ἧσσον ἑαυτῶν εἶναι τὴν ἀποικίαν ἢ 
Κερκυραίων…, 1.25). June Allison, analyzing the use of nomizô in the speech of Diodotus and 
throughout the Corcyraean stasis, states that the verb “carries greater authority, since it is, at least 
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in the speaker’s mind, by definition backed by society and convention or something that he 
claims should be accepted as nomos” (Allison, 76). The prominence of nomizô in Thucydides’ 
prose emphasizes Corinth’s respect for traditional practices, and supplication, “the most sacred 
of Greek appeals,” would be among them (Connor, 34-5 n.33). Because Corcyra has disregarded 
colonial nomoi for quite some time, most recently by refusing to put down the stasis in their own 
apoikia, the Corinthians view the Corcyraeans as violators of justice.19 It is for this reason that 
they hate the Corcyraeans.  
Indeed,  “Corcyra threatens the basic ideology by which Corinthians defined themselves 
… [challenging their] moral hegemony” with their naval and economic growth (Crane, 103-4). 
Because the Corcyraeans have achieved material power equal to Corinth’s (so they believe), they 
resent having to play a symbolically subservient as an apoikia to their metropolis in festivals 
(1.25.4). The Corcyraeans will say, in a later speech delivered at the Athenian ecclêsia “colonists 
are not sent abroad to be the slaves of those left behind, but to be their equals” (1.34*). Looking 
back to the pattern of the rule strong established in the Archaeology, we can see that the 
Corcyraeans, having amassed considerable material capital, are now challenging the Corinthians, 
who were originally their material betters. Because the Corcyraeans believe that they are equal, if 
not superior, to Corinth in power, they no longer have a reason remain symbolically subservient 
to them. As a result, they celebrate Phaeacian naval kleos, to glorify their material and naval 
                                                
19 Judging from the paradigms established within the Archaeology, Gomme notes that “one 
naturally suspects an economic motive … Not that a series of pinpricks, a constant provoking of 
touchy sensibilities, may not be the cause of greater quarrels” (Gomme, 159). Although 
Corinth’s economic interests in the West were significant (Gomme, 159 citing Head, 399). 
Thucydides has chosen only to elucidate the social and nationalistic considerations that went into 
Corinth’s acceptance of Epidamnus’ appeal.  
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might. The Corcyraeans’ celebration of these legendary seafarers of the Odyssey (Od.6.1-13.96) 
symbolizes and justifies their rebellion against their metropolis.20 
However, the Corcyraeans have strayed far from the noble nature of their Homeric 
predecessors. Thucydides tells us, without reservation, that the Corcyraeans have been made 
arrogant (ἐπαιρόµενοι, 1.25.4) by their material power. The Corcyraean arrogance that 
Thucydides has elucidated will be the lens through which we evaluate Corcyra’s diplomacy 
during the historian’s otherwise austere account of the Epidamnian affair. 
Thucydides suggests that Corcyra would not have taken any interest in the Epidamnian 
stasis had it not been for Corinth’s interference: “When the Corcyraeans discovered that the 
[Corinthian] settlers and the troops had arrived at Epidamnus and that the colony had been 
handed over to Corinth, they reacted violently. As soon as the news arrived they put to sea with 
twenty-five ships…” (Κερκυραῖοι δὲ ἐπειδὴ ᾔσθοντο τούς τε οἰκήτορας καὶ φρουροὺς ἥκοντας 
ἐς τὴν Ἐπίδαµνον τήν τε ἀποικίαν Κορινθίοις δεδοµένην, ἐχαλέπαινον: καὶ πλεύσαντες εὐθὺς 
πέντε καὶ εἴκοσι ναυσὶ…, 1.26.3*). The epeidê clause and adverbial euthus show us that it is not 
a concern for Epidamnus’ well-being that motivates Corcyra’s intervention, but Corcyra’s 
realization that the Corinthians are trying to increase their colonial influence by encroaching 
upon Epidamnus.  
Later, with another fleet, the Corcyraeans were also demanding in abusive 
language that the Epidamnians take back the oligarchs (for the oligarchic exiles of 
Epidamnus came to Corcyra, and begged for their help in being reinstated in 
Epidamnus, pointing to the tombs of their Corcyraean ancestors).  
 
ὕστερον ἑτέρῳ στόλῳ τούς τε φεύγοντας ἐκέλευον κατ᾽ ἐπήρειαν δέχεσθαι 
αὐτούς (ἦλθον γὰρ ἐς τὴν Κέρκυραν οἱ τῶν Ἐπιδαµνίων φυγάδες, τάφους τε 
ἀποδεικνύντες καὶ ξυγγένειαν, ἣν προϊσχόµενοι ἐδέοντο σφᾶς κατάγειν). 
         
                                                
20  Indeed, Corcyra and Corinth had a troubled history. Thucydides records that the first ever sea 




Here, Thucydides describes the demands issued by the subsequent Corcyraean fleet, noting in 
particular the abusive language that they use to address the Epidamnian democrats (κατ᾽ 
ἐπήρειαν). In this passage, he also tells us that, at some point, an envoy from the exiled oligarchs 
had gone to Corcyra and made a formal appeal to the Corcyraeans. It is not, however, genuine 
concern for the oligarchic suppliants that causes the Corcyraeans to intervene at Epidamnus. If 
that had been the case, then Corcyra would have intervened on behalf of the oligarchs when the 
Epidamnian democrats had first supplicated them. The Corcyraeans are merely taking the side of 
the oligarchs because the Corinthians have taken the side of the democrats. 
In the Epidamnian narrative, Thucydides makes a point of describing the details of the 
practice of supplication—the huddling in temples, the gesturing toward tombs of ancestors—in 
the democratic (1.24) and oligarchic appeals to their metropolis (1.26). Such detail gives his 
reader a sense of the cultural gravity of these acts. While these ethical practices may be 
important to the weaker Epidamnians, the narrative demonstrates that they are but secondary 
considerations to the more powerful nations of Corcyra and Corinth. Indeed, the Corcyraeans 
only begin to advocate on behalf of the oligarchs when they realize that the Corinthians are 
trying to take control of Epidamnus. Corinth does not help the democrats from pure compassion, 
but from the ulterior motive of harming Corcyra.  
Before battle is instigated between the Corinthians and Corcyraeans, the Corcyraeans 
send an envoy to the Corinthians, to try and make a settlement by arbitration or by “referring the 
matter to the oracle at Delphi” (1.28*). Thucydides tells us: 
The Corinthian reply to this was that if Corcyra withdrew the fleet and the foreign 
army from Epidamnus, then discussion might be profitable; but it was quite 
absurd to talk of arbitration while the city was still being besieged. 
        (1.28*) 
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Corinth’s agreement to arbitrate is conditional upon the Corcyraeans’ full withdrawal of their 
troops and barbarians from Epidamnus, a concession that would leave Corcyra strategically at 
Corinth’s mercy. It should also be noted that Corinth neglects to rebut Corcyra with the fact that 
Delphi had, in fact, decreed that Epidamnus should be Corinth’s. Even if the Corcyraeans would 
not have believed the Corinthians’ word, the same response would presumably have been given 
had they collectively visited the oracle.21 Furthermore, throughout Thucydides’ condensed record 
of the negotiation, Corcyra offers a total of four possible concessions that could be made to 
facilitate arbitration,22 all of which the Corinthians reject, holding fast to their initial demand that 
the Corcyraeans withdraw fully from Epidamnus before they would consider arbitration. By the 
time that the Corcyraeans have made two counter-offers to the demand (how long this exchange 
took is unspecified), Thucydides tells us that “None of these proposals was acceptable to the 
Corinthians. By this time their ships were manned and their allies were ready. They sent a herald 
in front of them to declare war…” (Κορίνθιοι δὲ οὐδὲν τούτων ὑπήκουον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐπειδὴ πλήρεις 
αὐτοῖς ἦσαν αἱ νῆες καὶ οἱ ξύµµαχοι παρῆσαν, προπέµψαντες κήρυκα πρότερον πόλεµον 
προεροῦντα Κερκυραίοις…, 1.29*). Because the Corinthians reject settlement by the Delphic 
oracle that would have likely worked in their favor, and because Thucydides shows the 
Corinthians declaring war as soon as their fleet was ready, it clear to me that the Corinthians 
prefer war to settlement: they see Epidamnus as a good excuse to launch an offensive campaign 
upon their wayward colony, Corcyra.  
                                                
21 Unless we are to imagine that the oracle had been rigged by Corcyra, as per de Ste. Croix, 68.  
22 First, the Corcyraeans offer to arbitrate via a congregation of the poleis or the via the Delphic 
oracle. Then, as a counterclaim to Corinth’s initial rebuttal, Corcyra agrees to withdraw its troops 
and barbarians from Epidamnus should Corinth do the same with its own troops, or, as an 
alternative, they suggest that they “let both sides stay in their present positions and to arrange an 
armistice to remain in operation until the result of the arbitration [is] declared” (1.28*). 
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The Epidamnian narrative affirms the prime sociological thesis of the Archaeology: that 
material rather than moral considerations form the bedrock of sociopolitical action. Thucydides 
illustrates that it is not ethical concerns for the Epidamnian oligarchs that motivate Corcyra’s 
intervention at Epidamnus, but the fact that their rival superpower, Corinth, is attempting to gain 
control of their colony. While the Corinthians are shown to value ethics more than the prehistoric 
peoples of the Archaeology, they reject interstate communal deliberation, dikê. Instead, they take 
the Epidamnian crisis as an opportunity to justly harm their enemy, Corcyra. Ultimately, both 
Corcyra and Corinth value power more than ethics. 
The Speeches at Athens: Interpretations of Justice (1.31-1.45)   
  Two years after Corcyra defeats Corinth in the first naval battle following the 
Epidamnian dispute (1.29-30), Corcyra and Corinth send delegates to the Athenian ecclêsia: the 
Corcyraeans need to win Athenian military support against an impending Corinthian retaliation 
against them, the Corinthians are seeking to prevent this alliance between Corcyra and Athens 
from occurring, so that they may carry on with their vengeance unimpeded (1.32-43). Regarding 
this debate that took place in Athens sometime between 432 and 431, Gregory Crane notes: 
“Many scholars, particularly modern students of ancient history, have analyzed the debate in 
moral terms, seeking to determine precisely who was right and who was wrong” (Crane, 94). 
Since the Epidamnian narrative is primarily focalized through the plight of the Epidamnian 
democrats, and since the Corinthians fight on the behalf of these democrats, I believe that moral 
sympathy toward Corinth is the more logical choice. On the other hand, Corcyra had made offers 
of arbitration and, to further complicate our moral judgment, there is the largely untold history of 
the long-standing enmity between these two nations, which Thucydides mentions only in passing 
at 1.13. Nevertheless, Corinth’s argument that Athens, bound by peace treaties to Corinth, should 
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either help them fight Corcyra or stay out of the conflict altogether (1.40-1) is, to my mind, a fair 
and straightforward argument, allowing for some of their rhetorical hyperbole.23  
 Justice is the subject of these first speeches in the History. It is fitting that justice be the 
subject of discussion, given the moral ambiguities left open by the Epidamnian narrative. Of the 
two speeches, Corcyra’s is my primary focus because it is here that Thucydides begins to 
demonstrate how principles like justice can be verbally manipulated to conceal self-interest. 
Furthermore, it is important that we get a sense of how Thucydides presents the Corcyraeans in 
Book 1 because the Corcyraean stasis will be the subject of this project’s concluding chapter.  
The Corcyraean Speech (1.32-36) 
While the Corcyraeans initially attempt to clothe their realist propositions in the rhetoric 
of justice, they eventually do away with this facade, advocating for an alliance on the basis of 
their naval strength alone: “If Corinth gets control of us first and you allow our navy to be united 
with hers, you will have to fight against the combined fleets of Athens and the Peloponnese” 
(1.36*). The Corcyraean envoy’s rhetorical progression from ideological argumentation to 
realpolitik resembles the trajectory that Athenian political policy will follow throughout the 
Peloponnesian War, starting from the soft power that they employ at Sybota (1.46-55) and 
Potidaea (1.56-65), to the blatant realpolitik that they employ at Melos (5.84-114). So too, the 
Corcyraean speech attempts to synthesize the meanings of justice and advantage, an act that 
foreshadows the linguistic kinêsis that will rack their homeland in Book 3 (3.82). In these ways, 
the Corcyraean speech seems too abstract to be a transcript of a historical speech. Instead, it 
                                                
23 When Corinth proclaims: “The ships of other states are forced to put into [Corcyra’s] harbours 
much more often than Corcyraean ships visit the harbours of other states” (1.37*) are we to think 
of 1.13 where Thucydides writes: “Corinth, planted on the isthmus, had been from time 
immemorial an important mercantile centre… those who lived inside and those who lived 
outside the Peloponnese had to pass through Corinthian territory”? Corinth’s complaint could be 
perceived as hypocritical here.     
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seems programmatic: as the Archaeology had established sociopolitical principles that would 
dictate the outcome of deeds in the History to a significant extent, so this first speech of the 
History establishes, in an exaggerated manner, the ways in which words can manipulate reality.    
The Corcyraean speech begins with a maxim about justice stated in the third person. This 
third person rhetorical device enables the Corcyraeans to distance themselves from their present 
circumstance of dire need. It also enables them to state their argument as if it were already a pre 
existing universal principle. The Corcyraeans are trying to (re)define the concept of justice in 
interstate relations:    
Δίκαιον, ὦ Ἀθηναῖοι, τοὺς µήτε εὐεργεσίας µεγάλης µήτε ξυµµαχίας 
προυφειλοµένης ἥκοντας παρὰ τοὺς πέλας ἐπικουρίας, ὥσπερ καὶ ἡµεῖς νῦν, 
δεησοµένους ἀναδιδάξαι πρῶτον, µάλιστα µὲν ὡς καὶ ξύµφορα δέονται, εἰ δὲ µή, 
ὅτι γε οὐκ ἐπιζήµια, ἔπειτα δὲ ὡς καὶ τὴν χάριν βέβαιον ἕξουσιν: εἰ δὲ τούτων 
µηδὲν σαφὲς καταστήσουσι, µὴ ὀργίζεσθαι ἢν ἀτυχῶσιν.  Κερκυραῖοι δὲ µετὰ τῆς 
ξυµµαχίας τῆς αἰτήσεως καὶ ταῦτα πιστεύοντες ἐχυρὰ ὑµῖν παρέξεσθαι 
ἀπέστειλαν ἡµᾶς. 
 
It is just, Athenians, that men coming to neighbors, seeking assistance without 
having done them a great service, without allegiance owed—as we are doing 
now—instruct, first and foremost that what they need is advantageous [for both 
parties], but if not, that it is not punishable at least, and secondly that they shall 
hold the favor securely. If they fail to establish these principles clearly, they 
should not be angry if they have not hit their target. The Corcyraeans sent us with 
a request for an alliance, trusting that what we have would be compelling for you.  
(1.32)  
 
The Corcyraeans begin by talking about a hypothetical envoy approaching a neighboring city to 
ask for assistance, but without having established the usual prerequisites for making such a 
request (µήτε εὐεργεσίας µεγάλης µήτε ξυµµαχίας προυφειλοµένης). This hypothetical envoy’s 
request would be atypical, then, since it would not fulfill the established norms of interstate 
reciprocity implied by the genitive absolutes. The Corcyraeans assert that it would, nevertheless, 
be just for the envoy seeking assistance to make an appeal offering political advantages to the 
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appealed-to party. By Corcyra’s reasoning, the principle of justice becomes conflated with a 
speech act, since ἀναδιδάξαι is the subject infinitive of δίκαιον. Anadidaskô suggests that what 
this embassy offers would transgress the established traditions of justice with regard to interstate 
reciprocity.24 In this way, anadidaskô can be thought of as a kind of proto-biaios didaskalos 
because it symbolizes the first attempt to transgress Hellenic nomoi by means of language in the 
History.  
Throughout this preamble situated in hypothetical circumstance, the Corcyraeans are, of 
course, indirectly referring to themselves. They are trying to frame ta sumphora within the 
semantic sphere of to dikaion to achieve two closely-related goals: first, to give their own 
argument an appealing aura of justice, and second, to flatter the Athenians by speaking to their 
history as a savior nation. As such, they argue that the advantages that their alliance offers would 
not only be material, but also moral:  
γενήσεται δὲ ὑµῖν πειθοµένοις καλὴ ἡ ξυντυχία κατὰ πολλὰ τῆς ἡµετέρας χρείας, 
πρῶτον µὲν ὅτι ἀδικουµένοις καὶ οὐχ ἑτέρους βλάπτουσι τὴν ἐπικουρίαν 
ποιήσεσθε, ἔπειτα περὶ τῶν µεγίστων κινδυνεύοντας δεξάµενοι ὡς ἂν µάλιστα 
µετ᾽ αἰειµνήστου µαρτυρίου τὴν χάριν καταθήσεσθε: ναυτικόν τε κεκτήµεθα πλὴν 
τοῦ παρ᾽ ὑµῖν πλεῖστον. 
 
 A noble outcome will be yours in many respects if you heed our request, firstly 
because you will aiding those being wronged and not those harming others, and, 
most of all, because you will establish favor in forever-memorialized proof 
                                                
24 Although Liddell and Scott use this passage to exemplify anadidaskô’s more general meaning, 
“instruct, inform,” it seems to me that the emphatic meaning “teach otherwise, or better” (LSJ, 
102) is fitting, as the Corcyraean ambassadors are trying to modify political norms. The verb is 
used in Herodotus to a somewhat similar effect: Salamoxis, once a slave in Samos, has returned 
to his native Thrace with considerable fortune and an Ionian education, having associated with 
figures like Pythagoras. He gains influence among the Getae, teaching them (anadidaskô) during 
meals that they are actually immortal, while having an underground chamber built. Eventually, 
he secretly goes into the chamber and remains there for three years. The Getae mourn. He then 
reemerges, and is later deified (Hdt.4.94-6). For those who change the logic of the world through 
language, great rewards are reaped.  
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when you receive us being in the utmost peril: and we have the strongest navy 
with the exception of your own.       
(1.33)    
 
Referring to the all-pervading dictum of Greek socio-political ethics—to “help friends and harm 
enemies” (Mitchell, 11)25—the Corcyraeans appeal to Athens’ mythic role as a sanctuary state 
for the abused by framing themselves as the victims (adikoumenoi) of Corinthian aggression. In 
this way, they “perform” their understanding of Hellenic ethical models, while alluding at the 
same time to a particular point of Athenian pride, one to which Thucydides also alludes in the 
Archaeology (1.1). Most importantly, the Corcyraeans promise the Athenians a charis of 
aiemnêstos marturios. Pericles will later praise the eternal memories of the Athenian dead held 
in the minds of all Hellenes: it is from this oration that we get a sense of how important it was for 
each Athenian citizen to leave behind a glorious and undying memory after death.26 In these 
ways, Thucydides has the Corcyraeans appeal to Athenian idealism. 
But immediately after this noble rhetoric, Thucydides has the Corcyraeans offer a purely 
material incentive for their alliance, linked to their prior statements with a curt connective te: 
“and we have the strongest navy, other than your own” (ναυτικόν τε κεκτήµεθα πλὴν τοῦ παρ᾽ 
ὑµῖν πλεῖστον, 1.33). Much of Corcyra’s subsequent argumentation through 1.33 continues to 
alternate between the moral and material advantages of the summachia they offer. I have found 
that this phrase from their speech best captures the spirit of their argument: “there is scarcely a 
case in history where all these advantages have been available at the same time” (1.33*). By 
                                                
25 The Corcyraeans could not legitimately say that the Corinthians were “enemies” to the 
Athenians because of the 30 Years Peace, so Thucydides has the Corcyraeans evoke this 
traditional dictum by calling the Corinthians blaptousi, “ those harming others.”  
26 κοινῇ γὰρ τὰ σώµατα διδόντες ἰδίᾳ τὸν ἀγήρων ἔπαινον ἐλάµβανον καὶ τὸν τάφον 
ἐπισηµότατον, οὐκ ἐν ᾧ κεῖνται µᾶλλον, ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ᾧ ἡ δόξα αὐτῶν παρὰ τῷ ἐντυχόντι αἰεὶ καὶ 
λόγου καὶ ἔργου καιρῷ αἰείµνηστος καταλείπεται. ἀνδρῶν γὰρ ἐπιφανῶν πᾶσα γῆ τάφος, καὶ οὐ 
στηλῶν µόνον ἐν τῇ οἰκείᾳ σηµαίνει ἐπιγραφή, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ µὴ προσηκούσῃ ἄγραφος µνήµη 
παρ᾽ ἑκάστῳ τῆς γνώµης µᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ ἔργου ἐνδιαιτᾶται (2.43). 
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arguing that their alliance would offer not only material advantages, but also moral advantages to 
the Athenians, the Corcyraeans build their argument to appeal to the Athenians’ idea of their role 
in history as a powerful and noble empire.  
The Corinthian Speech (1.37-43) and the Athenian Verdict (1.44-5)  
 The Corcyraean speech is a tough act to follow. The Corinthians are not offering any 
material or moral advantages to the Athenians, but are advocating that they act on principle 
alone, by honoring the established peace treaties between Athenians and Peloponnesians: “The 
right course surely,” they say, “is either for you to preserve a strict neutrality or join us against 
them. At least you have treaty obligations towards Corinth…” (1.40*).  
While the Corcyraeans had claimed in their speech that a war with the Peloponnesians 
was inevitable (1.36), the Corinthians state that this is not the case:  
Do not think: “the Corinthians are quite right in what they say, but in the event of 
war all this is not in our interest.” … you must remember that, though Corcyra is 
trying to frighten you into doing wrong, there is no certainty that a war will 
come… The power that deals fairly with its equals finds truer security than the 
one which is hurried into snatching some apparent but dangerous advantage.  
(1.42*) 
The Corinthians argue that the Athenians would find a greater security in honoring the peace 
treaties, than by allying with the Corcyraeans for the sake of greater naval defense. The 
Athenians would “be making the wisest decision in their own interests” (1.43*) by fulfilling their 
end of the charis that the Corinthians had bestowed upon the Athenians some years ago, when 
they gave the Athenians warships for their fight against Aegina, and also prevented the other 
Peloponnesian states from aiding the revolt of Samos (1.41).  
 The Athenians hold two assemblies to discuss the matter: at the first, “opinion seemed to 
incline in favor of the Corinthian arguments, but at the second there was a change, and they 
decided on entering into some kind of alliance with Corcyra” (1.44*). They do so because “It 
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seemed to the Athenians that they would have a war on their hands against the Peloponnesians” 
(ἐδόκει γὰρ ὁ πρὸς Πελοποννησίους πόλεµος καὶ ὣς ἔσεσθαι αὐτοῖς, 1.44.2). Not wanting to 
break the treaties, however, they decide to form a type of alliance called an epimachia, one that 
would be defensive rather than the standard offensive summachia. This word epimachia is 
unattested in Greek before Thucydides,27 and is likely to be an Athenian invention, especially 
considering the care that Thucydides takes to describe how it would function: “this was not to be 
a total alliance involving the two parties in any war which either of them might have on hand; for 
Athens realized that if Corcyra required them to join in an attack on Corinth, that would 
constitute a breach of their treaty with the Peloponnese” (1.44*). Here, we see Athenian legal 
ingenuity at work, formulating a legal term that allows them to accept the Corcyraean alliance 
without bearing the shame of breaking the treaties.  
At this point, The Thirty Years Peace—what we know of it— ought to be examined, so 
that we may understand the situation that Athens, Corinth, and Corcyra are in.  Here, I use de St. 
Croix’ account of the terms of the treaty,28 of which terms one, three and six are important for 
our purposes: 
1. It was to last for thirty years. 
3. Neither side was to make an armed attack on the other, if the latter wished to go to     
arbitration.   
6. Any state not [enlisted in a treaty with Athens or Sparta] (an agraphos polis) could ally 
itself with either side. 
                                                
27 By de St. Croix’s reckoning, epimachia appears only in Aristotle and Demosthenes, thereby 
making Thucydides the first to use this word (Appendix XIII).  
28 de Ste. Croix, “The Origins of the Peloponnesian War,” Appendix I.  
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The treaty does not account for a situation in which a nation forms an alliance with an agraphos 
polis already at war with a member of one of the leagues. Who, then, would be making an armed 






















Chapter 2: Seeing Double  
Introduction 
This chapter demonstrates how the advantages (ta sumphora) that Athens pursues in the 
political disputes at Epidamnus and Potidaea turn out to be asumphora, thereby illustrating the 
principle that much of war is paralogos. Because the Athenians habitually choose to pursue ta 
sumphora without circumspection, it argues that they understand the concept of paralogos in 
word, but not in deed. It suggests that the reason that the Athenians are unable to be politically 
circumspect is because they live imaginatively in their imperial ideal, an ideal facilitated by 
Periclean erôs for Athens.  
Doublesight in Deed and Word: Sybota (1.45-55) & the Athenian Speech at Sparta (1.72-8) 
 Shortly after the Athenians form an epimachia with the Corcyraeans, they send a fleet of 
ten ships to Corcyra sometime between 433-432 as a safeguard against the impending Corinthian 
assault. This fleet is under the commands of Lacedaemonius, Diotimus, and Proteas—three 
commanders for ten ships, as many commanders as would be in charge of the monumental 
Sicilian Expedition (6.42). While Plutarch suggests that the small size of the fleet is contrived by 
Pericles to make trouble for Lacedaemonius, the son of his political rival, Cimon (Gomme, 177-
8, n. 45.2),29 there is, I believe, another plausible rationale for its small size: that a small, highly-
monitored fleet would ensure that orders were followed with the utmost precision, orders that 
could not be hazarded on the fortunes of war. Thucydides has the Athenian generals report these 
orders to their fleet:  
                                                
29 Hornblower does not believe that there is any reason to doubt Lacedaemonius’ patriotism, or 
to believe that Pericles attempted this sabotage (Hornblower, 88 n. 45.2).   
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προεῖπον δὲ αὐτοῖς µὴ ναυµαχεῖν Κορινθίοις, ἢν µὴ ἐπὶ Κέρκυραν πλέωσι καὶ 
µέλλωσιν ἀποβαίνειν ἢ ἐς τῶν ἐκείνων τι χωρίων: οὕτω δὲ κωλύειν κατὰ δύναµιν. 
προεῖπον δὲ ταῦτα τοῦ µὴ λύειν ἕνεκα τὰς σπονδάς. 
 
[The generals] briefed their fleet to not battle the Corinthians at sea, unless they 
were either sailing toward Corcyra and intending to disembark, or toward any part 
of the Corcyraean districts. If this were the case, then they were to prevent the 
Corinthians from doing so insofar as they were able. These briefings were made 
so that the treaties would not be broken. 
(1.45) 
 
These orders state that it is unacceptable for the Athenians to battle the Corinthians in the open 
sea. Instead, they must wait to fight the Corinthians until they see that they are about to land 
upon Corcyraean soil. In the minds of the Athenian strategists, these orders must be followed 
with the utmost precision—to do otherwise would be to break the peace treaties by attacking 
Corinth, a member of the Peloponnesian League, rather than defend Corcyra, their newfound ally 
with whom they have made an epimachia.  
The Athenians, in other words, formulate this strategy on an assumed legal technicality 
that “defending” Corcyra can only occur when enemy vessels are in close proximity to land and 
are “about to disembark.” At this moment and this moment only—when the Athenians perceive 
that the enemy is about to move from sea to land—can the Athenians prevent a Corinthian 
landing with their ships and still have it constitute “defense” without breaking the treaties. 
Would the Corinthians (or any non-Athenian party for that matter) respect this highly technical 
approach to international law?  
Looking at the first Athenian speech of the History, that of the Athenian envoys at Sparta, 
and the reaction that it provokes from the Spartan ephor Sthenelaidas (1.86), we will see how 
Thucydides presents Athens’ perception of itself in relation to the Peloponnesians’ perceptions of 
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Athens. This will inform our understanding of what the Athenians had hoped to achieve by their 
diplomatic naval strategy at Sybota, and will help us judge how realistic their hopes were.   
Shortly after the events at Sybota and Potidaea, Athenian envoys, who were already in 
Sparta on business unspecified by Thucydides, happen to witness the Corinthians urging the 
Spartans to declare war on Athens (1.68-71). As a result, the envoys feel compelled to speak on 
behalf of their homeland: 
This delegation of ours did not come here to enter into a controversy with your 
allies, but to deal with the business on which our city sent us. We observe, 
however, that extraordinary attacks have been made on us, and so we have come 
forward to speak. We shall make no reply to the charges which these cities have 
made against us. Your assembly is not a court of law, competent to listen to pleas 
either from them or from us.    
(1.73*) 
The Athenian envoys begin their speech by announcing that it is not appropriate for them to 
defend Athens against the damning charges that the Corinthians have made, since the 
Peloponnesian assembly is not, by Athenian nomoi, a court of law. After showing no respect for 
Spartan nomoi, the Athenians hypocritically proceed to complain about how little respect their 
own nomoi receive from other Greeks:    
… unreasonably enough, our very consideration for others has brought us more 
blame than praise.  For example, in law-suits with our allies arising out of 
contracts we have put ourselves at a disadvantage, when we arrange to have such 
cases tried by impartial courts in Athens, people merely say that we are overfond 
of going to law. No one bothers to inquire why this reproach is not made against 
other imperial Powers, who treat their subjects much more harshly than we do: the 
fact being, of course, that where force can be used there is no need to bring in the 
law. Our subjects, on the other hand, are used to being treated as equals; 
consequently, when they are disappointed in what they think right and suffer even 
the smallest disadvantage because of a judgment in our courts or because of the 
power that our empire gives us, they cease to feel grateful to us for all the 
advantages which we have left to them… People, in fact, seem to feel more 
strongly about their legal wrongs than about their wrongs inflicted on them by 
 39 
violence. In the first case they think they are being outdone by an equal, in the 
second case that they are being compelled by a superior.  
(1.77*) 
 
The Athenians claim that the democratic legal practices which they employ in the adjudication of 
their empire are done purely out of principle because they prove rather troublesome to manage. 
The Athenians also mention “other imperial Powers”—Corinth and Sparta implied—as 
counterexamples to their own method of democratic imperial adjudication. These powers, they 
claim, adjudicate their empires with violent treatment that is met with neither resistance nor 
reproach from Peloponnesian subjects. We know that this assertion would be particularly 
insulting to the Corinthians at this assembly; earlier, at the Athenian ecclêsia, the Corinthians 
had said: “our… colonies do respect us, and indeed they treat us with great affection… the 
majority are pleased with us” (1.38*).  
The Athenians’ comparison of their principled system of imperial adjudication to that of 
the Peloponnesians’ implies that the Athenian empire is morally superior to the Peloponnesians’. 
Thus, it is not only the pretentious attitude that the Athenian envoy takes to the institution of the 
Spartan assembly, but also the self-aggrandizing and implicitly condemnatory content of their 
speech that insults the assembled Peloponnesians. The Spartan ephor Sthenelaidas openly voices 
his distaste for the zealous Athenian speech: 
I do not understand these long speeches which the Athenians make. Though they 
said a great deal in praise of themselves, they made no attempt to contradict the 
fact that they are acting aggressively against our allies and the Peloponnese.   
        (1.86*) 
 
Here, Sthenelaidas expresses his distaste at both the tone and the content of the Athenian speech, 
a speech that began by dictating to the assembled Peloponnesians that their assembly was, in 
fact, illegitimate to make decisions regarding pleas, “Your assembly is not a court of law, 
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competent to listen to pleas either from them or from us” (1.73*). The Athenians speak as though 
Sparta were already a subject of their empire and Sthenelaidas’ anger highlights the fact that the 
Athenian envoys’ strict adherence to Athenian nomoi at a Spartan assembly is neither 
appreciated nor respected.  
The Athenians intended for their speech to “divert their [Peloponnesian] audience from 
the idea of war and make them incline towards letting matters rest” (1.72*). Given the arrogant 
tone and nationalistic content of the Athenian speech, however, one might initially think that the 
Athenians are ignorant of the fact that their nomoi are not globally appreciated. However, their 
speech itself reveals an awareness of how resentful the Hellenic world has grown toward them 
for their self-aggrandizement and accumulation of power.30 In this way, the Athenian envoy is 
possessed by a kind of doublesight in which they see what is, in fact, a single reality as two 
wholly disconnected realities: they see that the Peloponnesians and Athenian subject states alike 
resent the Athenians for their self-aggrandizement, but fail to fully comprehend the causal 
relation between anti-Athenian resentment and Athenian self-aggrandizement.31 In other words, 
the Athenians prove incapable of thinking outside of their imperial ideal.  
 As the Athenian envoys do not account for the nature of their Peloponnesian audience in 
the crafting of their speech, so the Athenian war council did not account for the paralogos nature 
of war with their overly-subtle and rigidly-formulated battle plan for Sybota. Thucydides tells us 
                                                
30 “… we must refer to the Persian War, to events well known to you all, even though you may 
be tired of constantly hearing the story” (1.73*). 
31 In fact, this doublesight resembles Thucydides’ way of writing about the Athenian empire 
under Pericles—chronicling its failures and logical fallacies during his command, yet praising 
the man as a bastion of Athens nevertheless (2.65). 
 
 41 
that the Athenian generals are anxious, or even in a state of fear32 about their orders from the 
Athenians: “they did not begin battle, anxious about [or fearing] the orders of the Athenians” 
(µάχης δὲ οὐκ ἦρχον δεδιότες οἱ στρατηγοὶ τὴν πρόρρησιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων, 1.49.4). These 
generals are anxious because the actual state of the battle at Sybota does not conform to the 
abstract picture that the Athenians had anticipated.  
 The battle at Sybota is, we learn, noisy and confusing: “Everywhere in the battle 
confusion reigned, and there was shouting on all sides.” “It was a battle where courage and sheer 
strength played a greater part than scientific methods” (ἦν τε ἡ ναυµαχία καρτερά, τῇ µὲν τέχνῃ 
οὐχ ὁµοίως, 1.49.2*). We quickly realize that the Athenian naval technê designed to uphold the 
terms of the epimachia is not suited to the nature of the battle at Sybota, a battle of sheer 
strength; this is not the sort of battle Phormio will win at Rhium by technê (1.87-1.92) because 
“no one attempted the manoeuvre of encirclement” and “both sides relied more for victory on 
their hoplites, who were on the decks and who fought a regular pitched battle there while the 
ships remained motionless” (1.50*).  
Eventually, it becomes apparent that the Corcyraeans, being outnumbered 110 to 150 by 
the Corinthians, will lose the battle. When the Athenian fleet recognizes this, they cease from 
support tactics and fight the Corinthians openly at sea contrary to their orders.33 Thucydides 
describes this outcome as “inevitable” because the Athenian generals are in a catch-22 position  
(ξυνέπεσεν ἐς τοῦτο ἀνάγκης, 1.49.7*): if they wait until the Corcyraean forces are routed, then 
they are in the lunatic position of fighting the Corinthian armada closing in to shore with their 
                                                
32 Athenian generals were held fully accountable for military failures. Deidô suggests the 
generals’ fearing the consequences of failure, like banishment (5.26). This will be discussed in 
more detail later.   
33 “… their assistance at the end of ch. 49 will be unjustified…” (Hornblower, 90 n. 46.3). 
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ten ships alone. Thus, it is out of necessity that they disobey their orders, by fighting in the open 
sea: this gives the Athenians the best chance of saving the Corcyraeans and themselves.   
Given the situation that the Athenian fleet had to face at Sybota, it is ironic that the 
Athenian envoys in Sparta should describe war as paralogos:  
think… of the great part of the unpredictable in war… the longer a war lasts, the 
more things tend to depend on accidents. Neither you nor we can see into them: 
we have to abide their outcome in the dark.  
 
τοῦ δὲ πολέµου τὸν παράλογον, ὅσος ἐστί, πρὶν ἐν αὐτῷ γενέσθαι προδιάγνωτε: 
µηκυνόµενος γὰρ φιλεῖ ἐς τύχας τὰ πολλὰ περιίστασθαι, ὧν ἴσον τε ἀπέχοµεν καὶ 
ὁποτέρως ἔσται ἐν ἀδήλῳ κινδυνεύεται. 
(1.78*)  
 
A great portion of war is paralogos—unpredictable and contrary to reason. By the time that the 
Athenian envoys have uttered this principle, Thucydides has already shown this to be true at 
Sybota, where the highly-technical battle plan devised by the Athenians had proved entirely 
useless in a battle of pure might. Here too, the rhetorical technê of these Athenian envoys proves 
useless to placate the Spartans and the other assembled Peloponnesians: Sthenelaidas views their 
words as incomprehensible pollous logous, and proceeds to incite his fellow Spartans to declare 
war upon Athens (1.86). At both Sybota and the Spartan assembly, Thucydides is showing us 
that Athenians understand paralogos in theory, but not, most importantly, in practice. 
Potidaea: An Exposition on Political Friendship and Enmity (1.56-65) 
The next stage of the cold war between Athens and Corinth manifests at Potidaea “almost 
immediately after” the battle at Sybota (1.56*). Potidaea, like Epidamnus, is a smaller city that 
has socio-political ties to two imperial powers: Corinth, as a colony, and Athens, as a tribute-
paying ally. Thucydides introduces his record of the events at Potidaea by giving us insight into 
the post-Sybotan strategizing of the Corinthians and the Athenians: 
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τῶν γὰρ Κορινθίων πρασσόντων ὅπως τιµωρήσονται αὐτούς, ὑποτοπήσαντες τὴν 
ἔχθραν αὐτῶν οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι Ποτειδεάτας, οἳ οἰκοῦσιν ἐπὶ τῷ ἰσθµῷ τῆς Παλλήνης, 
Κορινθίων ἀποίκους, ἑαυτῶν δὲ ξυµµάχους φόρου ὑποτελεῖς, ἐκέλευον τὸ ἐς 
Παλλήνην τεῖχος καθελεῖν καὶ ὁµήρους δοῦναι, τούς τε ἐπιδηµιουργοὺς 
ἐκπέµπειν καὶ τὸ λοιπὸν µὴ δέχεσθαι οὓς κατὰ ἔτος ἕκαστον Κορίνθιοι ἔπεµπον, 
δείσαντες µὴ ἀποστῶσιν ὑπό τε Περδίκκου πειθόµενοι καὶ Κορινθίων…  
 
While the Corinthians were preparing how they might retaliate against the 
Athenians, the Athenians, having perceived Corinth’s enmity, were commanding 
the Potidaeans, who dwell on the isthmus of Pallene as colonists of Corinth (but 
tribute-paying allies of Athens) to take down their wall facing Pallene, to give 
them hostages, to banish their Corinthian magistrates, and to no longer receive the 
magistrates sent on a yearly basis from Corinth, fearing that they would revolt 
under persuasion from Perdiccas and the Corinthians…      
(1.56.2) 
 
Thucydides does not make it known where the Corinthians planned to strike, presumably 
because he, like the other Athenians, did not know himself; the Athenians anticipate that the 
Corinthians will take retaliatory action, and choose Potidaea as the city in which to preempt 
them.      
 Why Potidaea? First, we are told that Athens fears that Perdiccas and the Corinthians will 
incite a revolt there, a revolt that could “draw in other allied cities to revolt in the Thracian area” 
(1.56*). Then, we are told that Perdiccas had originally been an “ally and friend” to the 
Athenians, but was now an enemy because the Athenians had formed an alliance with his 
enemies, Philipp and Derdas (Περδίκκας… ξύµµαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὤν. ἐπολεµώθη δὲ ὅτι 
Φιλίππῳ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφῷ καὶ Δέρδᾳ κοινῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐναντιουµένοις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυµµαχίαν 
ἐποιήσαντο, 1.56.2-3). Thucydides’ condensed history of Athenian relations with Perdiccas 
evokes their recent diplomatic relations with Corinth regarding Corcyra: the Athenians had 
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angered both of these parties by making alliances with their bitter enemies.34 Thus, the Athenians 
choose to anticipate the Corinthians’ retaliation in Potidaea because they are wary of the hatred 
of Corinth and Perdiccas. The disadvantages that come with the Athenians’ neglect charis and 
philia are meant to contrast with the advantages that we see philia bringing to the 
Peloponnesians for their campaigns at Sybota and Potidaea, for which they easily gain voluntary 
military support from their friends.35  
Perdiccas proves himself to be a particularly dangerous enemy to the Athenians. 
Thucydides presents him as the centrifugal force pulling Corinth, Potidaea, Sparta, and other 
Thracians into an anti-Athenian resistance movement in Thrace: “Perdiccas was alarmed by 
these moves [i.e. the Athenians breaking their alliance with him, to ally with his enemies, Philipp 
and Derdas] and not only sent his agents to Sparta in order to try to involve Athens in a war with 
the Peloponnese, but was also approaching Corinth in order to get support for a revolt in 
Potidaea” (δεδιώς τε ἔπρασσεν ἔς τε τὴν Λακεδαίµονα πέµπων ὅπως πόλεµος γένηται αὐτοῖς 
πρὸς Πελοποννησίους, καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους προσεποιεῖτο τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἕνεκα ἀποστάσεως, 
1.57*). In this passage, Thucydides presents the “idea” of the Peloponnesian War germinating in 
Perdiccas’ mind, “he… sent his agents to Sparta in order to try to involve Athens in a war with 
                                                
34 Although Thucydides does not specify why the Athenians had chosen to ally themselves with 
Philipp and Derdas, it would be safe to assume that they did so because of some perceived 
political advantage, as had been the case at Epidamnus.  
35 Thucydides notes in his record of Sybota that “There were many of the [Sybotan] barbarians 
reinforcing the Corinthians on the mainland: for these Sybotans were always philoi to them” 
(ἦσαν δὲ καὶ τοῖς Κορινθίοις ἐν τῇ ἠπείρῳ πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων παραβεβοηθηκότες: οἱ γὰρ 
ταύτῃ ἠπειρῶται αἰεί ποτε αὐτοῖς φίλοι εἰσίν, 1.47); at Potidaea, Thucydides notes that Aristeus, 
the general sent by Corinth to support the Plataean revolt, “had always been a staunch friend to 
the people of Potidaea. And it was largely because of his personal popularity that most of the 
Corinthian volunteers joined the expedition” (ἐστρατήγει δὲ αὐτῶν Ἀριστεὺς ὁ Ἀδειµάντου, 
κατὰ φιλίαν τε αὐτοῦ οὐχ ἥκιστα οἱ πλεῖστοι ἐκ Κορίνθου στρατιῶται ἐθελονταὶ ξυνέσποντο: ἦν 
γὰρ τοῖς Ποτειδεάταις αἰεί ποτε ἐπιτήδειος, 1.60-1*).  
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the Peloponnese.”36 Perdiccas, whom Thucydides emphatically states had been both an ally 
(summachos) and a friend (philos) to Athens, has been backed into a corner by Athens’ flagrant 
power grabs. Needing to protect his kingdom against Athens, his lost ally and newfound enemy, 
Perdiccas begins to foment revolts among the Chalcidians and Bottiaeans (1.57).  
Thucydides says that fear caused the Peloponnesian War: “what made war inevitable was 
the growth of Athenian power and the fear which this caused in Sparta” (1.23*). At Epidamnus, 
Sybota, and Potidaea, Thucydides shows how the Athenians’ non-traditional, overreaching, even 
treacherous (in the case of Perdiccas) diplomacy produces fear in other political parties expecting 
more traditional, reciprocal treatment from the Athenians. 
 When the Potidaeans hear the demands that the Athenians are making of them—that they 
send hostages to Athens, exile their Corinthian magistrates, tear down their defensive walls, be 
treated as prisoners more than allies, in other words—they send representatives 
to Athens in the hope of persuading the Athenians not to make any alterations in 
the existing state of affairs (νεωτερίζειν µηδέν). They also sent representatives 
with the Corinthians to Sparta in order to win support there in case it should be 
necessary (ἢν δέῃ). After long negotiations at Athens nothing valuable was 
achieved; in spite of all their efforts, the fleet for Macedonia was ordered to sail 
against them too. The Spartan authorities, however, promised to invade Attica if 
the Athenians attacked Potidaea. This, then, seemed to the Potidaeans to be the 
moment: they made common cause with the Chalcidians and the Bottiaeans and 
revolted from Athens.    
(1.58*) 
These initial Athenian demands are very intrusive, and must have left the Potidaeans fearing 
what the Athenians would do next, should they comply. As an alternate resort (ἢν δέῃ), the 
Potidaeans send an envoy to Sparta, to see if the Spartans would help them, should the Athenians 
refuse their requests. Although Thucydides’ use of ἢν δέῃ here suggests that the Potidaeans are 
                                                
36 Although the Corinthians had been trying to get Sparta involved in a war with the Athenians 
for some time as well, we learn (1.68).   
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more trustworthy than the Athenians give them credit for, the Potidaeans fail to gain Athens’ 
trust. In fact, after hearing the Potidaean representatives, the Athenians decide to add to their 
security measures at Potidaea, by sending an additional fleet to Potidaea from Macedonia. The 
Potidaeans then revolt, having been promised assistance by the Spartans. Their revolt is shown to 
be as much a product of Athenian pressure as it is of Sparta’s offer to assist in their revolution.  
When the Athenians arrive in Thrace to implement security measures in Potidaea, they 
are surprised to find not only Potidaea already in revolt, but also the Chalcidians and the 
Bottiaeans. As a result, they end up going back to Macedonia because “with the forces at their 
disposal it was impossible to make war both against Perdiccas and against the league of revolted 
cities” (1.59*). The Athenians were certain that they would prevent a revolution in Potidaea by 
carrying through with their political intervention; to the contrary, Potidaea’s certainty that 
Athens will intervene in their affairs necessitates their rebellion (ἢν δέῃ, 1.58), which, in turn, 
further exacerbates tensions already building in Thrace, and results in more rebellions against 
Athens.  
Disadvantageous Advantages: Ta Sumphora Paraloga 
At the Athenian ecclêsia, the Corinthians had encouraged the Athenians to not become 
fixated on seizing the “apparent” advantages before them, but to act with reciprocity and 
fairness: this, they claimed, would be the most advantageous thing for the Athenians to do as 
well.37 The Athenians do not heed the Corinthians’ words, however, and from Epidamnus to 
Potidaea, Thucydides shows us the inflammatory results of the Athenians’ seizure of apparent 
                                                
37 Corinthians: “We should like…for you to decide that you ought to behave towards us as we 
have behaved towards you. Do not think: “the Corinthians are quite right in what they say, but in 
the event of war all this is not in our interest.” … you will find that an act of kindness done at the 
right moment has a power to dispel old grievances quite out of proportion to the act itself… Do 
not be influenced by the fact that [the Corcyraeans] are offering you a great naval alliance. The 
power that deals fairly with its equals finds a truer security than the one which is hurried into 
snatching some apparent but dangerous advantage” (1.42-3*).  
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advantages. Once the Potidaeans revolt under Athenian pressure, they join up with Perdiccas and 
the Corinthians, to fuel a tripartite rebellion in the Thracian region, one so big that Thucydides 
will call it a parousê dunamis (1.59.2). It is with these revolutionary fires burning in Thrace that 
the Corinthians approach the Spartans and urge them to destroy what they now call the turannos 
polis of Athens: “Let us now liberate the Hellenes, who have been enslaved!” they cry, 
effectively giving their war an ideological brand and a good public image (τοὺς νῦν 
δεδουλωµένους Ἕλληνας ἐλευθερώσωµεν, 1.124.2).  
Indeed, their message carries: Thucydides tells us that when war was first declared 
between the Peloponnesians and the Athenians, “people’s feelings were generally very much on 
the side of the Spartans, especially as they proclaimed that their aim was the liberation of Hellas” 
(2.8*). Ironically, the Athenian democrats are seen ruling their empire by force, while the 
Peloponnesian oligarchs are seen leading voluntary rebellions against Athens with their philoi—
all this despite the Athenian envoys’ claim that the Peloponnesians were widely-resented in 
Greece (1.77).     
In these ways, the Potidaean narrative validates the Corinthians’ words as prophetic: the 
Athenians’ relentless prioritization of advantage over reciprocity not only foments the onset of 
the Peloponnesian War, but also gives the Athenians a bad public image that will haunt them 
throughout the war’s course, an image that the Peloponnesians capitalize upon. Nowhere is this 
more apparent than in the Spartan general Brasidas’ Thracian campaign, in which he successfully 
gets a number of cities under Athenian control to revolt. Of his campaign, Thucydides wryly 
remarks:  
The Athenians also feared that their allies would revolt, since Brasidas was 
behaving with great moderation and was constantly declaring wherever he went 
that his mission was the liberation of Hellas. The cities subject to Athens, when 
they heard of the capture of Amphipolis, of the terms being offered, and of the 
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considerate behaviour of Brasidas himself, eagerly embraced the idea of change, 
made overtures to him, begging him to march on into their territory, and vied with 
each other in being the first to revolt. 
(4.108*)   
Given Athens’ bad image in Thrace, it is no coincidence that Brasidas campaigns so effectively 
there, even working in tandem with Perdiccas after he captures Amphipolis (4.107).38 Brasidas 
would be crowned with gold or decked with garlands throughout his future “liberating” exploits 
(4.121), all the while making promises of freedom to the Greeks which the Spartans “cheerfully 
ignored,” after they won the war, establishing “tightly-controlled pro-Spartan governments” 
instead (Ober, 228). In Book 1, the unpopularity of the Athenians’ “tyrannical” decisions 
regarding Corcyra and Potidaea make it that much easier for the Spartans to gain a strong 
foothold in Thrace in Book 4 because Brasidas employs the positive rhetoric of freedom.  
And as for the apparent sumphora that the Corcyraeans offered? These islanders 
eventually prove themselves to be troublesome and treacherous allies, come the Corcyraean 
stasis (3.70). Furthermore, Corcyra is an isolationist city—unpopular and widely-resented, by 
Corinth’s reckoning.39 Therefore, the Corcyraeans bring no friends along with them into the 
Athenian alliance, quite unlike what we see happening in the Thracian resistance movements. 
Finally, “that Corcyra lay very conveniently on the coastal route to Italy and Sicily” only further 
enables and legitimizes the disastrous Sicilian Expedition. In these ways, what the Athenians 
                                                
38 For further study of this fascinating campaign, Mary P. Nichols devotes the 3rd chapter of her 
book Thucydides and the Pursuit of Freedom to Brasidas, of which there is a subchapter on this 
commander’s Thracian campaign. I have not had time to read it, but have included it in my 
bibliography for further reference.   
39 Corinth: “The ships of other states are forced to put in to [the Corcyraean] harbours much 
more often than the Corcyraeans visit the harbours of other states… in cases where a Corcyraean 
has been guilty of injuring some other national, the Corcyraeans are themselves their own judges, 
and there is no question of having the case tried by independent judges appointed by treaty. So 
this neutrality of theirs, which sounds so innocent, was in fact a disguise opted not to preserve 
them from having to share in the wrong doings others, but in order to do wrong themselves, 
making away with other people's property by force…” (1.37*).  
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thought would be advantages turn out to be disadvantageous, as a result of the unpredictability of 
war (paralogos polemou).  
Athens, The Hypnotic City  
Could the Peloponnesian War have been avoided if the Athenians had been less 
opportunistic in its early stages? Thucydides does not deal in hypotheticals, and I myself can 
provide no definite answer. Later in the war, Cleon will argue that the public image of Athens is 
irrelevant to its success as an empire, and that there should be no effort made to improve the 
city’s public relations: “a democracy is incapable of governing others… feelings of compassion 
[for subject states] will not make them love you [i.e. the Athenians] any more” (3.37*). But 
Cleon urges this in 427, five years after the events at Potidaea and Thrace, events that 
Thucydides narrates in such a way as to suggest that the Athenians, by maintaining their alliance 
with Perdiccas, by honoring charis with Corinth, and by trusting the Potidaeans, might possibly 
have prevented the initial outbreak of rebellions in Thrace, rebellions that gave fuel to the fire of 
the so-called Hellenic liberation. Although war might not have been avoidable altogether, the 
outcome might have been significantly different for Athens. 
Thucydides portrays the Athenians as being blind to the consequences of their habitually 
mistrustful and aggressive politics. This blindness becomes readily apparent when Pericles 
addresses the subject of friendship in his Funeral Oration:  
… in questions of general good feeling there is a great contrast between us and 
most other people. We make friends by doing good to others, not by receiving 
good from them. This makes our friendship all the more reliable, since we want to 
keep alive the gratitude of those who are in our debt by showing a continued 
good-will toward them…  
(2.40*) 
 
Pericles’ claim that Athenian friendship is steadfast and widely renowned has already been 
proven untrue by the political realities that the Epidamnian and Potidaean narratives illustrate. 
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Cleon will tell the Athenians in the Mytilenaean debate: “you cannot even think straight about 
the facts of life that are before you. You are simply victims of your own pleasure of listening, 
and are more like an audience sitting at the feet of a professional lecturer than a parliament 
discussing matters of state” (3.38*). Cleon would have the Athenians accept their city as the 
turannos polis that it has become in the eyes of Hellas. If he had delivered this speech earlier, 
perhaps reality would have broken through the self-delusion of the Athenians; forced to confront 
the fact that the Greeks perceived them as a turannos polis, the Athenians could have made an 
effort to change their bad public image before it was too late. During these first years of the war, 
however, Pericles is encouraging the Athenians to see their city as “an education to Greece” 
(1.40*), and to “fall in love” with Athens for the nomoi of freedom that it bestows: “What I 
would prefer is that you should fix your eyes every day on the power of Athens as she really is, 
and should fall in love with her” (ἀλλὰ µᾶλλον τὴν τῆς πόλεως δύναµιν καθ᾽ ἡµέραν ἔργῳ 
θεωµένους καὶ ἐραστὰς γιγνοµένους αὐτῆς, 2.43**). Pericles’ reference to the force of erôs is 
moving, yet curious—worthy of inquiry given the discords between what his words claim about 
Athens and what the narrative has shown about Athens. The way in which the chorus of 
Euripides’ Hippolytus characterizes erôs will provide a useful lens through which to view the 
word’s more sinister connotations: 
  Love (erôs) distills desire upon the eyes, 
  love brings bewitching grace into the heart 
  of those he would destroy. 
  I pray that love may never come to me 
  with murderous intent 
  in rhythms measureless and wild. 
(Hippolytus, 525-30) 
 
The erôs of the Hippolytus facilitates a divide between beautiful dream and dangerous reality, as 
does Funeral Oration between the Athenians’ vision of their city and the current political reality. 
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It is blind erôs for Athens that prevents the Athenians from accepting the tyrannical image that 
their city now carries outside the confines of its walls. Later, it will be the erôs they feel for the 
Sicilian Expedition40 that turns their attention away from the war at hand, and the festering social 
problems within their city’s walls.41 In both scenarios, erôs, blinding the eyes of the Athenians, 
makes them believe things that are not there by “bringing bewitching grace” into their hearts, 
hearts “[it] would destroy.” Indeed, the words and appearance of the charming Alcibiades—a 
veritable poster boy for Athenian expansion—will cause the Athenians to stare spellbound into a 















                                                
40 “There was a passion for the enterprise which affected everyone alike” (καὶ ἔρως ἐνέπεσε τοῖς 
πᾶσιν ὁµοίως ἐκπλεῦσαι, 6.24). 
41 The desecration of the stone Hermae at 6.27 foreshadows the societal collapse that occurs 
within Athens in the stasis of Book 8.  
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Chapter 3: Normalizing Atrocity  
Introduction 
In Book 3, Thucydides finally returns his gaze to Corcyra, recording the monumental 
stasis that ravages the island in the summer of 427. This event occurs four years after war had 
officially been declared between Athens and Sparta in 431 (2.7), six years after the battle at 
Sybota between Corcyra and Corinth in August of 433 (1.46-55), and approximately eight years 
after the first naval battle between Corcyra and Corinth off the coast of Epidamnus (1.29-30), a 
product of the Epidamnian revolution that had occurred in the months before August of 435 
(1.24).42 During this long historical (and narrative) interim between Sybota and the stasis, 
Thucydides mentions the Corcyraeans on only two occasions: they are included among the list 
that Thucydides has compiled of Athenian allies at the outbreak of the war (2.9), and the 
historian mentions that 50 Corcyraean ships join the 100 Athenian ships sailing around the 
Peloponnese during the first year of the war, “doing damage at various places” and “land[ing] in 
the Spartan territory of Methone … [making] an attack on the fortifications there” (2.25*). This 
information is important because it tells us that the original Athenian-Corcyraean epimachia has, 
unsurprisingly, become a full-on offensive alliance, after war had officially been declared 
between Athens and Sparta.  
 The first objective of this chapter is to illustrate how the events recorded in Book 3 that 
precede the stasis—the revolt of Mytilene (3.1-35), and the subsequent debate regarding the fate 
of the Mytilenaean prisoners (3.36-50); the fall of Plataea, and the tragic execution of these most 
steadfast of Athenian allies (3.51-68)—display the necessities of war eroding the ethical value 
                                                
42 There is a consensus of dates between Warner, Gomme, and Hornblower assigned to the 
Corcyraean stasis, the declaration of war between Athens and Sparta, and the battle of Sybota. 
For dating the Epidamnian revolution that occurred pro toude polemou according to Thucydides, 
I use Hornblower’s estimation of 435 (Hornblower, 66-7 n. 24-55).  
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systems proclaimed by the Athenians and the Spartans in Books 1 and 2. The second objective of 
this chapter is to investigate the collapse of ethical values within cities as a result of the pressures 
of the Peloponnesian War. We begin or study of civic collapse by examining Thucydides’ 
historical record of the political kinêsis on Corcyra in the summer of 427 (3.70-81). From there, 
we examine how these ethical violations become justified and codified into new nomoi by means 
of linguistic kinêsis (3.82-4). 
An Analysis of Book 3’s Pre-Stasis Narrative Structure: (3.1-3.69) 
The 400 Plataean men, 110 Plataean women, and 80 Athenian hoplites within Plataea are 
being starved out under siege by the Peloponnesians and Boeotians, “seeing no hope of help 
coming to them from Athens” (3.20*). Just three chapters earlier, Thucydides had stated how 
glorious the Athenian fleet was at this time, “At the time when this fleet was at sea, Athens 
seems to have had almost the largest number of ships in action at the same time that she ever 
had, and beautifully equipped too.” He then notes that the maintenance of this fleet and the siege 
of Potidaea are the chief drains on the Athenian revenue (3.17*).  
Between the scenes of the glorious Athenian fleet at sail and the starving Plataeans near 
capitulation, Thucydides tells us that the Athenians are aiming to put down a recent and shocking 
revolt in Mytilene, for which a citizen contribution of 200 talents had been raised to fund it, a 
first in Athenian history. Even this citizen contribution had proved insufficient, however, so the 
Athenians send out ships to collect an additional tax from their allies (3.19).  
Thucydides’ interspersion of these three fields of operations displays the inability of the 
Athenians to cover all their bases—moral and material—under rapidly growing economic strain. 
Indeed, their glorious fleet can do little to relieve Plataea, a city situated inland, because the 
Athenians will not hazard a land war against the Peloponnesian siege army, in adherence to the 
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Periclean policy.43 So too, the Athenians are constrained by lack of funds because of the ongoing 
siege at Plataea and the grandeur of their fleet.  
The Plataeans, on the other hand, had demonstrated their loyalty to Athens in Book 2 by 
remaining in their city, although they were about to endure a Spartan siege: “The Plataeans … 
decided not to desert the Athenians, but to endure, if it had to be so, seeing their land laid waste 
and all the other sufferings that might befall them” (2.74*). The Plataeans remained in their city 
both out of long-standing loyalty to Athens and because the Athenians had promised to help the 
Plataeans with a solemn and formal oath.44 For this reason, the Athenians’ decision to prioritize 
reconquering Mytilene over saving the Plataeans and the 80 Athenians inside Plataea for the sake 
of philia and the fulfillment of charis is all the more disconcerting given Pericles’ assertion 
about the steadfastness of Athenian friendship in the Funeral Oration (2.34).  
As the besieged Plataeans are forsaken by the Athenians, so the Mytilenaeans, now under 
Athenian siege, are forsaken by the Spartans, who had promised them their assistance. Alcidas, 
the Spartan general sent to relieve Mytilene, arrives after the Athenians have begun setting up 
siege operations. Not wanting to risk battle with their fleet, he sails away (3.29-32). The 
Mytilenaeans eventually capitulate under siege because of a lack of food (3.27) and the leading 
conspirators in the revolt are then taken to Athens, among them Salaethus, their Spartan 
representative and ringleader. Salaethus is put to death immediately, although “there were things 
which he was offering, especially to withdraw the Peloponnesians from Plataea, which was still 
                                                
43 See Pericles’ speeches at 1.142-3 and 2.13. And so we ask: just how did Pericles intend to 
defend inland allies vulnerable to attacks from the Peloponnesian land army?  
44 Athenians: “Men of Plataea, the Athenians say that in all the time that we have been their allies 
they have never once abandoned you to an aggressor, nor will they desert you now. Instead they 
will give you all the help they can, and they solemnly appeal to you in the name of the oaths 
which your fathers swore not to make any changes in the existing alliance” (2.73*). 
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being besieged” (ἔστιν ἃ παρεχόµενον τά τ᾽ ἄλλα καὶ ἀπὸ Πλαταιῶν (ἔτι γὰρ ἐπολιορκοῦντο) 
ἀπάξειν Πελοποννησίους, 3.36). 
 Thucydides’ interweaving of fields of battle in his narrative from 3.17 to 3.20—the glory 
of the Athenian fleet sailing around the Peloponnese, the Athenian plan to attack Mytilene, the 
suffering of those trapped in Plataea, to whom Athens is supposed to be bound by oath to aid—
has implicitly demonstrated that the Athenians are prioritizing advantage over ethics, raising 
money to regain control of Mytilene at the expense of the lives of their desperate allies in Plataea 
(not to mention their own Athenian soldiers). Even worse is their decision to execute Salaethus, a 
potential bargaining chip for the rescue of the Plataeans: the Athenians’ decision to execute 
Salaethus shows their thoughtless prioritization of emotional catharsis over loyalty to friends.45  
The final disturbance that Thucydides highlights in the historical sequence of events that 
precede the Corcyraean stasis is the Spartan mass execution of the surrendered Plataeans. Just 
two chapters before the stasis narrative begins at 3.70, Thucydides informs us that Sparta’s 
decision to kill the Plataeans “was largely, or entirely, because of Thebes… they considered that 
at this stage of the war the Thebans were useful to them” (3.68*). By saying this, Thucydides 
offers “his own gloss on the situation” (Hornblower, 464 n.4): the Thebans have behaved 
atrociously; not only had they illegally invaded Plataea while the 30 Years Peace was in place 
(2.2), but in doing so, had also betrayed the League's plan to delay the war with Athens so that 
they could be better prepared for it (1.125). Nevertheless, it is the Thebans who are catered to, 
and at a bloody cost. In this way, the Spartan tradition of independence and self-assurance 
alleged by Archidamus in Book 1 proves to have little practical value when it comes to winning 
                                                
45 Hornblower thinks that it is unlikely that Salaethus could fulfill this promise. Thucydides, 
however, has included this information for a reason (Hornblower, 417 n. 36.1).  
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this new PanHellenic war;46 the Spartans do what the Thebans want to keep them fighting on 
their side. Thus, the national characteristics proclaimed by the Athenians and the Spartans in 
Books 1 and 2 disintegrate almost immediately under the strain of war. Rather than ethical 
principles, the powerful emotions of pride and anger along with the more rational but equally 
brutal realist considerations of military advantage hold sway over their policies. 
All major powers of the History execute a harsh, realist military policy as though human 
life were not valued at all. As readers of the History, we become numb to it, and it is only in rare 
instances like the Mytilenaean debate47 or the Samians’ complaints made to Alcidas about his 
execution policy48 that we are reminded that the total destruction of the enemy—warriors and 
innocents alike—may be the norm in the History, but it is not supposed to be this way, at least 
for Greeks. Indeed, when Thucydides records, with his usual restraint, how the Mycallessian 
schoolboys were slaughtered at the hands of bloodthirsty Thracian mercenaries, we must infer 
that this is “unexpected ” (adokêtos) from the perspective of the Mycallessians themselves, 
“disaster fell upon the entire city, a disaster more complete than any, more sudden and more 
                                                
46 “...we are no more likely to give in shamefacedly to other people’s views when they try and 
spur us on by their accusations” (1.84*). 
47 The Athenians had originally voted “to put to death not only those [Mytilenaeans] now in their 
hands but also the entire adult male population of Mytilene, and to make slaves of the women 
and children” (3.36*). The next day, however, “there was a sudden change of feeling and people 
began to think how cruel and unprecedented such a decision was…” (καὶ τῇ ὑστεραίᾳ µετάνοιά 
τις εὐθὺς ἦν αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀναλογισµὸς ὠµὸν τὸ βούλευµα καὶ µέγα ἐγνῶσθαι, 1.36.4*).  
Thus, the Athenians realize that their earlier resolution had been savage, ômon, a behavior 
antithetical to the Periclean ideals of Athenian society, and a product of rage, orgê, rather than 
reason. The Athenians, manage to shake off this blind rage, and restrain themselves from the 
brink of an ômon kai mega paradeigma that will become the norm in the ômê stasis of Corcyra 
(3.82).  
 
48 “... a deputation of Samians from Anaia came to [Alcidas] and told him that it was not the right 
way to set about the liberation of Hellas by massacring people who had never raised a hand 
against him… Alcidas saw the force of this argument and released all the prisoners from Chios 
whom he still had…” (3.22*). 
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horrible” (καὶ ξυµφορὰ τῇ πόλει πάσῃ οὐδεµιᾶς ἥσσων µᾶλλον ἑτέρας ἀδόκητός τε ἐπέπεσεν 
αὕτη καὶ δεινή, 7.30*). By this time, it is respite from such atrocities that has become abnormal.  
The Stasis on Corcyra: (3.70-3.82) 
The stasis on Corcyra marks the official beginning of sociopolitical atrocity’s 
normalization throughout the Hellenic world. Thucydides’ record of the Corcyraean stasis comes 
in two parts: from 3.70-81 the narrative is historical, factual, and chronological; from 3.82-4 the 
narrative is an abstract analysis of stasis’ societal impact. The images of men being butchered on 
the altars of temples, and of suppliants starving to death in the temple of Dionysus serve as the 
climactic conclusion to the historical account of the Corcyraean stasis and are symbolic of the 
degree to which civilization on Corcyra has devolved. 
Thucydides’ historical account of the stasis (3.70-81) is punctuated by the arrivals and 
departures of ships from the major powers of the Peloponnesian War: Corinth, Athens, and 
Sparta. Accordingly, my argument is structured around these arrivals and departures, to show 
that there is a correlation between the behavior of the Corcyraeans and which power(s) are 
docked in their harbors. In examining the actions of the Corcyraeans actions in accordance with 
which outside powers are present, I hope to demonstrate that there is, in fact, a degree of validity 
to how Corinth had characterized the Corcyraean ethos: “she wanted no allies because her 
actions were wrong, and she was ashamed of calling in others to witness her own misdoings”—a 
statement that had seemed hyperbolic then (1.37*). Given the conflict of interests among the 
Corcyraeans themselves and among the other nations interested in Corcyra, it makes sense that 
the behavior of the Corcyraeans should be, to some extent, contingent upon who is watching. All 
Corcyraeans, as we shall see, are self-interested to the core, democrats and oligarchs alike, 
“Leaders of parties in the cities had programmes which appeared admirable—on the one side 
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political equality for the masses, on the other the safe and sound government of the aristocracy—
but in professing to serve the public interest they were seeking to win prizes for themselves” 
(3.82*).  
Thucydides tells us that the Corcyraean stasis began with the return of Corcyraean 
prisoners from Corinth. These prisoners had been captured by the Corinthians during the sea 
battles between Corcyra and Corinth in 435 and 433. Thucydides’ phraseology “The 
Corcyraeans began to be in a state of stasis, ever since 49 the Corcyraean prisoners captured from 
the sea battles off of Epidamnus came home, having been released by the Corinthians” does not 
tell us when these prisoners were released to return home, and has thus given rise to conflicting 
views as to when they might have been released (οἱ γὰρ Κερκυραῖοι ἐστασίαζον, ἐπειδὴ οἱ 
αἰχµάλωτοι ἦλθον αὐτοῖς οἱ ἐκ τῶν περὶ Ἐπίδαµνον ναυµαχιῶν ὑπὸ Κορινθίων ἀφεθέντες, 
3.70).50  
We last saw these prisoners in Book 1 being taken to Corinth after the battle at Sybota: 
[The Corinthians, having sailed away after the battle,] sold 800 of the captured 
Corcyraean prisoners who were slaves, and they kept in captivity 250 whom they 
treated with great consideration (ἐν θεραπείᾳ εἶχον πολλῇ), hoping that a time 
would come when they would return and win over the island to Corinth. Most of 
them were in fact people of great power and influence in Corcyra.   
(1.55*) 
 
The Corinthian therapeia was successful: these powerful Corcyraeans are now seen 
“approaching citizens individually with the aim of detaching the city from Athens” (3.70*). With 
some amount of pampering, the Corcyraean elites let go of their ancient feud with Corinth, 
forsaking the very isolationism that Thucydides had portrayed as a cornerstone of Corcyraean 
                                                
49 Or “because,” in John Wilson’s rendering, to avoid temporal ambiguity. See Hornblower, 467 
n. 70.1.   
50 Gomme advocates for sometime before the spring of 427, close to when the stasis broke out, 
whereas Wilson believes that the Corcyraean prisoners were returned in 430 or earlier, therefore 
working the minds of their fellow citizens for several years (Hornblower, 467 n.70.1).   
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identity in Book 1. Even the “strongest” convictions can be reversed with a little therapeia 
(1.55), it would seem. So too, the growing influence of democracy in Corcyra as a result of its 
epimachia with Athens would have further incentivized the Corcyraean elites to work with the 
oligarchic Corinthians. The prisoners return home to find an Athenian etheloproxenos,51 Peithias, 
who wields a good deal of power in the Corcyraean council. This does not bode well for the 
Corcyraean elites, so an alliance with Corinth gives them the opportunity to gain back their 
traditional sphere of influence in Corcyra.  
a. 1 Corinthian Ship, 1 Athenian Ship 
 After the returned prisoners had been approaching Corcyraean citizens individually for 
some unspecified amount of time, a ship from Corinth and a ship from Athens arrive at Corcyra 
with the “accredited representatives” from each state, to put matter of political allegiance to vote 
(3.70*). The “ people of Corcyra voted in favour of remaining allies of Athens in accordance 
with the original agreement, at the same time preserving their friendly relations with the 
Peloponnese” (3.70*). Gomme calls this second clause of the vote—“to remain friends with the 
Peloponnesians, just as before”—“make-believe and self-deluding diplomacy” (Gomme, 360 n. 
2 “Peloponnêsiois de philoi”).52 This is well said: the “make-believe” quality of Corcyraean 
                                                
51 A word found only in Thucydides. “Presumably a voluntary proxenos was so called to 
distinguish him from a hereditary one… what looks like a technical term for an Athenian 
institution” (Hornblower, 468 n.3). Indeed, that proxenos would be a voluntary position speaks 
to the excitement about Athenian lifestyle on Corcyra.  
52 Gomme will go on to say: “the pro-Peloponnesian [i.e. the returned Corcyraean prisoners] 
party had won something [in putting the matter to vote]—the reassertion of old friendship and of 
the terms of the alliance with Athens, with which the action in 431 might strictly be said to have 
conflicted. They had won a moral victory, and they go on to attack Peithias for wanting to go 
farther than the resolution allowed in the alliance with Athens…” Gomme’s argument here is an 
ingenious solution to resolve the ambiguous status of the Corcyraean-Athenian alliance. But to 
make this assertion, Gomme assumes that the offensive role that we saw the Corcyraeans playing 
in the Athenian alliance (2.25) was a result of Athenian coercion going beyond the terms of their 
original epimachia with Athens. As such, he seems to believe that the pro-Peloponnesian 
Corcyraeans are following some sort of moral prerogative to restore the original terms of their 
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diplomacy, seems to reside somewhere between absurdity, naiveté, and cold calculation: absurd 
because the Corcyraeans had been Corinth’s bitterest enemies for years (1.25); naive because the 
notion that the Athenians or the Corinthians would be satisfied with Corcyra’s noncommittal 
vote is absurd; coldly calculating, nevertheless, because the Corcyraeans seem prioritize what 
they perceive to be their own interests by pandering to Athens and Corinth simultaneously. The 
duplicity of the Corcyraeans results in their own destruction, however, as both Athens and 
Corinth eventually abandon them to stasis.  
b. 1 Athenian Ship 
The Corinthian ship departs Corcyra carrying the news of the vote, while the Athenian 
ship remains in the harbor. The outcome of the vote—to be allies (in some unspecified capacity) 
with Athens, while remaining friends with the Peloponnesians—is, in truth, entirely 
inconclusive. Now, the pro-Peloponnesian party brings a legal charge against Peithias, the 
Athenian etheloproxenos. In doing so, they seek to eliminate the leading pro-Athenian advocate 
among their fellow Corcyraeans, who seem to have not yet decided whether to ally with the 
Athenians or Peloponnesians: “The charge [that they made] against him was that he was 
                                                                                                                                                       
epimachia with Athens. I am not convinced; let us not forget that the Corcyraeans had originally 
wanted a summachia with Athens, and promised their charis to Athenians (1.32-6). When the 
war began, Thucydides tells us that “The Athenians were examining their current alliances and 
were sending envoys to the lands around the Peloponnese, Corcyra, Cephallenia, Acarnania, and 
Zacynthus, realizing that they could make war all around the Peloponnesus if they could secure 
friendships with these places” (Ἀθηναῖοι δὲ τήν τε ὑπάρχουσαν ξυµµαχίαν ἐξήταζον καὶ ἐς τὰ 
περὶ Πελοπόννησον µᾶλλον χωρία ἐπρεσβεύοντο, Κέρκυραν καὶ Κεφαλληνίαν καὶ Ἀκαρνᾶνας 
καὶ Ζάκυνθον, ὁρῶντες, εἰ σφίσι φίλια ταῦτ᾽ εἴη βεβαίως, πέριξ τὴν Πελοπόννησον 
καταπολεµήσοντες, 2.7). Accordingly, at 2.8, we see Corcyra listed as an official Athenian ally. 
As such, it should be recognized that Corcyra was most certainly in a summachia with Athens at 
this point. The pro-Peloponnesian party is not trying to save their country from Athenian 
“enslavement,” so much as it is trying to gain power for itself, as I will go on to demonstrate in 
the body of my argument. Contrary to what Gomme thinks, it is fairly clear to me that Peithias is, 
in fact, the one who is trying to restore original relations between Athens and Corcyra.   
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enslaving Corcyra to Athens” (ὑπάγουσιν αὐτὸν οὗτοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἐς δίκην, λέγοντες Ἀθηναίοις 
τὴν Κέρκυραν καταδουλοῦν, 3.70.3*). Peithias, however, is acquitted. This is unsurprising since 
just five years before, the Athenians had saved the Corcyraeans from probable death and 
enslavement at the hands of the Corinthians. Among the Corcyraeans, then, there must have been 
some residual gratitude for Athens’ support at this time.  
Peithias’ legal retaliation is far more compelling. He “bring[s] to trial five of the richest 
of his opponents on the charge of having procured vine-props by cutting them on the ground 
sacred to Zeus and Alcinous” (ὁ δὲ ἀποφυγὼν ἀνθυπάγει αὐτῶν τοὺς πλουσιωτάτους πέντε 
ἄνδρας, φάσκων τέµνειν χάρακας ἐκ τοῦ τε Διὸς τοῦ τεµένους καὶ τοῦ Ἀλκίνου, 3.70*). By 
taking the five wealthiest of his opponents to trial, Peithias deliberately transforms what was 
initially a diplomatic dispute over which power the Corcyraeans should ally with, into a conflict 
between the classes on Corcyra. The charge of asebeia that he brings against these men is merely 
a prophasis for his true aims to pit the dêmos against the oligoi; he may as well have accused 
these five men of being greedy and rich.  
The five rich men, “having been convicted [of Peithias’ charge] were sitting as suppliants 
in the temple on account of the amount of the fine, in order that they might pay it in increments” 
( ὀφλόντων δὲ αὐτῶν καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἱερὰ ἱκετῶν καθεζοµένων διὰ πλῆθος τῆς ζηµίας, ὅπως 
ταξάµενοι ἀποδῶσιν, 3.70.5). By offering to pay their fine in installments, the wealthy convicts 
agree to work within the bounds of the law (in word, at least); an opportunity for political 
compromise and social healing is suggested by the moderate behavior of the convicts. 
Nevertheless, Peithias carries the charge through.  
Now backed into a corner, the pro-Peloponnesians retaliate through open violence: 
“Being now exposed to the full rigour of the law and at the same time learning that Peithias 
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intended, while he was still a member of the council, to persuade the people to make an offensive 
and defensive alliance with Athens, the five accused joined up with the rest of their party and, 
armed with daggers suddenly broke in on the Council and killed Peithias and some sixty 
others...” (3.70*). The murder of Peithias marks the end of civic discourse on Corcyra. From 
here on out, violence will reign supreme.  
c. No Ships in the Harbor    
The members of the Corcyraean council who had survived the attack of the pro-
Peloponnesian party now take refuge on the Athenian trireme still in the Corcyraean harbor. 
After they are shuttled back to Athens (3.70), the pro-Peloponnesian party 
… also sent at once to Athens envoys to explain recent events at Corcyra, showing how 
these were for the interests of Athens, and to persuade those who had taken refuge there 
to do nothing prejudicial to them, in order that there might not be a reaction against 
Corcyra.  
 
πέµπουσι δὲ καὶ ἐς τὰς Ἀθήνας εὐθὺς πρέσβεις περί τε τῶν πεπραγµένων διδάξοντας ὡς 
ξυνέφερε καὶ τοὺς ἐκεῖ καταπεφευγότας πείσοντας µηδὲν ἀνεπιτήδειον πράσσειν, ὅπως 
µή τις ἐπιστροφὴ γένηται.          
          (3.7153) 
 
It comes as no surprise that the Athenians arrest these Corcyraean envoys on the spot, since the 
escaped council members who witnessed the murder of Peithias first-hand had already arrived in 
Athens (3.72). Here, Thucydides’ use of the verbs didaskô and sumpherô to describe the content 
of the speech that the Corcyraean envoy had planned to deliver evokes Corcyra’s first appeal to 
Athens during the Epidamnian dispute in Book 1.54 These rhetorical similarities between the 
speeches illustrate a Corcyraean pattern of duplicity. 
d. 1 Corinthian Ship  
                                                
53 C.F. Smith, 129.  
54 Namely, anadidaskô and ta sumphora (1.32). 
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After this brief arrest scene in Athens, Thucydides subsequently returns his gaze to the 
happenings on Corcyra: 
ἐν δὲ τούτῳ τῶν Κερκυραίων οἱ ἔχοντες τὰ πράγµατα ἐλθούσης τριήρους 
Κορινθίας καὶ Λακεδαιµονίων πρέσβεων ἐπιτίθενται τῷ δήµῳ, καὶ µαχόµενοι 
ἐνίκησαν. 
 
Meanwhile, on the arrival of a Corinthian trireme with delegates from Sparta 
aboard, the party who held power in Corcyra attacked the democrats and defeated 
them in the fighting.  
          (3.72.2*) 
As in 3.70,55 the entrance of the Corinthian trireme into the Corcyraean harbor is demarcated by 
a temporal genitive absolute. Presumably, the Corcyraean dêmos did not submit to the demands 
of the party now in power (οἱ ἔχοντες τὰ πράγµατα), tensions rose, and one party attacked the 
other. In the subsequent chapters, the island of Corcyra becomes a veritable battlefield, with the 
dêmos occupying the acropolis and harbor, and the other party, whom Thucydides now officially 
begins to call hoi oligoi (3.74), occupying part of the agora and the section of the harbor 
opposite to the dêmos. Political dissent has evolved into full-on class warfare on Corcyra. We 
can imagine the Corinthians and Spartans watching from their trireme as their investment in 
these Corcyraean nobles falls to shambles; Corcyra would not be easily won, and “When the 
dêmos had prevailed, the Corinthian ship began to sail away in secret” (καὶ ἡ Κορινθία ναῦς τοῦ 
δήµου κεκρατηκότος ὑπεξανήγετο, 3.74).   
In this urban warzone, the oligarchs “set fire to the houses and the blocks of apartments 
round the town square, so that there should be no means of approach. They spared neither their 
own property nor that of others…” (3.74*). Thucydides tells us that this blaze almost consumes 
and destroys the city of Corcyra in its entirety. The final image of the Corcyraean stasis—the 
oligarchs “burn[ing] their boats [on the shore of Corcyra], so that there should be no hope left to 
                                                
55  καὶ ἀφικοµένης Ἀττικῆς τε νεὼς καὶ Κορινθίας… (3.70.2). 
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them except in a final conquest of their country” (3.85*)—exemplifies the extent to which the 
oligarchs are hazarding their own well-being to gain back political power. Indeed the stasis, by 
this point, has departed somewhat from the self-interested aims with which it began; “revenge,” 
Thucydides will write, “was more important than self-preservation” (ἀντιτιµωρήσασθαί τέ τινα 
περὶ πλείονος ἦν ἢ αὐτὸν µὴ προπαθεῖν, 3.82.7*). Like animals in the food chain, the 
Corcyraeans now value the killing of others over their own preservation. 
Linguistic Kinêsis (3.82-5) 
 Even more horrible than the lives destroyed in the political kinêsis that ravaged Corcyra 
is the fact that its atrocities were justified by a kinêsis of language itself. In this next and most 
famous section of Thucydides’ discussion of stasis (no longer the Corcyraean stasis, but a 
meditation stasis generally), the historian details how the customary understandings of the 
meanings of words changed. These changes result in a powerful and pervasive illusion that 
Greek nomoi are still being maintained in stasis, while in actuality they are all being horribly 
violated. Although Thucydides is no moral relativist,56 by using the verb nomizô to illustrate 
these changes, the historian shows us that men in the throes of stasis believe (or make 
themselves believe) that their depraved actions are still in accordance with nomos.57 Socio-
                                                
56 “Indeed, it is true that in these acts of revenge on others men take it upon themselves to begin 
the process of repealing the general laws of humanity which are there to give a hope of salvation 
to all who are in distress, instead of leaving those laws in existence, remembering that there may 
come a time when they, too, will be in danger and will need their protection” (3.84*). This may 
be an interpolation, however. See Hornblower, 489 n.84.  
57 τόλµα µὲν γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνοµίσθη, µέλλησις δὲ προµηθὴς δειλία 
εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχηµα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν ξυνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν 
(3.82.4).   
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political evil, to be sustained, must remain blind to itself; the linguistic kinêsis facilitates this 
blindness.58  
 Before turning to the phenomenon of linguistic kinêsis, it is important that we first 
understand Thucydides’ abstract sociological analysis of the cause of stasis. Thucydides outlines 
the circumstances that produce stasis in what I have found to be a rather complex A-B-A 
structure. On an initial reading, his presentation of the cause of stasis might not seem so 
disjointed because of the confidence with which he presents his ideas. I have found, however, 
that Thucydides proposes three groups of consecutive theses in 3.82, which, although 
thematically related, are not plainly established as causal relations in the historian’s prose. 
Below, I have isolated what I consider to be each “thesis” with a subheading and a brief 
summary of its content. After outlining this A-B-A structure, I will offer my interpretation of 
what Thucydides is trying to express, and why he might have chosen to express it in this 
tripartite structure. 
A.1 Political Leaders in Peace and War 
And while in a time of peace [the leaders of democratic factions and oligarchical 
factions] would have had no pretext for asking their intervention [i.e. Athens and Sparta], 
nor any inclination to do so, yet now that these two states were at war, either faction in 
the various cities, if it desired a revolution, found it easy to bring in allies also, for the 
discomforture at one stroke of its opponents and the strengthening of its own cause. 
 
καὶ ἐν µὲν εἰρήνῃ οὐκ ἂν ἐχόντων πρόφασιν οὐδ᾽ ἑτοίµων παρακαλεῖν αὐτούς, 
πολεµουµένων δὲ καὶ ξυµµαχίας ἅµα ἑκατέροις τῇ τῶν ἐναντίων κακώσει καὶ σφίσιν 
αὐτοῖς ἐκ τοῦ αὐτοῦ προσποιήσει ῥᾳδίως αἱ ἐπαγωγαὶ τοῖς νεωτερίζειν τι βουλοµένοις 
ἐπορίζοντο. 
 
                                                
58 Lebow, on the other hand, suggests that “the Greeks became increasingly irrational and 
inarticulate (alogistos), and, like animals, no longer capable of employing the logos (rational 




In peace, the leaders of political parties within cities are unable to formulate pretexts 
(prophaseis) to bring harm (kakôsis) to their enemies and power to themselves. In war, however, 
they may formulate such prophaseis with ease. 
B. Human Nature & Stasis 
And so there fell upon the cities on account of revolutions many grievous 
calamities, such as happen and always will happen while human nature is the 
same, but which are severer or milder, and different in their manifestations, 
according as the variations in circumstances present themselves in each case. 
 
 καὶ ἐπέπεσε πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόµενα µὲν καὶ αἰεὶ 
ἐσόµενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, µᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς 
εἴδεσι διηλλαγµένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ µεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται. 
 
The calamities of stasis will fall upon cities as long as human nature remains the same, although 
the exact circumstances and level of severity of any given stasis may vary.  
A.2 Cities and Private Individuals in Peace and War 
 
For in peace and prosperity both states and individuals have gentler feelings, because 
men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, which robs men of 
the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster and creates in most people a 
temper that matches their condition. 
 
ἐν µὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγµασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀµείνους τὰς γνώµας 
ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ µὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν: ὁ δὲ πόλεµος ὑφελὼν τὴν εὐπορίαν τοῦ 
καθ᾽ ἡµέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν πολλῶν ὁµοιοῖ. 
 
        (3.82.259) 
 
In peace, private citizens (idiôtai) and cities (poleis) have better inclinations because they do not 
have to face unwilled necessities. The biaios didaskalos of war, however, reorients their 
emotions (orgai) to accord with their dire circumstances because it deprives them of their 
provisions (euporia). This change in human temperament caused by wartime devastation and the 
                                                
59 C.F. Smith, 143.  
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deprivation of goods suggests that the pre-war akousioi anagkai are no longer akousioi. Because 
the war has leveled people’s emotions to accord with their violent surroundings, they now pursue 
violent revolution as their new and alternate livelihood, “knowledge of what had happened 
previously in other places [in stasis] caused still new extravagances of revolutionary zeal” 
(3.82.3*).  
Conclusions 
Thucydides’ analysis of party leaders in stasis (A.1) is partitioned off from his analysis of 
cities as a whole (poleis) and their private citizens (idiôtai) (A.3) by his assertion that stasis will 
repeat itself so long as human nature remains the same (A.2). Such a division between party 
leaders, private citizens, and cities themselves is the principle oddity in Thucydides’ presentation 
of the cause of stasis with which I am concerned.  
Party leaders, while not sanctioned outright, are not presented flatteringly either. Unlike 
cities and independent citizens, whom Thucydides says have “gentler feelings” in peacetime 
(Section A.2), the most he can say about political leaders in peacetime is that they do not have a 
prophasis to harm their enemies and gain power for themselves (Section A.1). It is the advent of 
war, Thucydides says, that encourages and enables political leaders to aggressively pursue self-
interested aims because they can wield it as a prophasis. As the war has enabled political leaders 
to vie openly for power, so their words seduce the ordinary citizens to join them in internecine 
atrocities:  
Leaders of parties in the cities had programmes which appeared admirable—on 
one side political equality for the masses, on the other the safe and sound 
government of the aristocracy—but in professing to serve the public interest they 
were seeking to win the prizes for themselves.60  
                                                
60 My reading conflicts with the sentiment expressed in 3.84, which asserts that the atrocities of 
stasis are acts of retaliation of the lower classes against their abusive ruling class. This chapter, 
however, has been rejected by the scholiast as an interpolation, and Dionysius fails to mention it. 
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The individual in the polis, now deprived of euporia and desperate for change, heeds these 
noble-sounding words and joins wholeheartedly in the civil war, while his familial role is washed 
away by the fervor of rebellion, “Family relations were a weaker tie than party membership…” 
(3.82.5*). It is, then, a two-pronged force that brings cities into stasis: war deprives citizens of 
euporia, and self-interested politicians promise solutions to these deprivations. Stasis is an 
eternally recurring phenomenon because it part of human nature to heed the noble-sounding 
promises of politicians in times of great distress (γιγνόµενα µὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόµενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ 
φύσις ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, 3.82). 
At war in Thucydides are not only the great nations of Athens and Sparta, but also two 
schools of thought: that of the Ionian intellectual tradition, for which Pericles is the fifth-century 
figurehead, and the biaios didaskalos of war, of which the Corcyraean stasis and other Hellenic 
staseis are both products and pupils.61 We can imagine these two schools of thought marching 
side-by-side through the History like armies themselves, for Connor has noted that the verb 
prokhôreô, used to describe the progression of the “savage stasis” through Greece (οὕτως ὠµὴ 
<ἡ> στάσις προυχώρησε, 3.82), is the same verb that Thucydides uses to describe the progress of 
Ionian civilization toward greatness in the Archaeology (καὶ Ἴωσι προχωρησάντων ἐπὶ µέγα τῶν 
πραγµάτων, 1.16). In this passage, Thucydides describes how stasis progresses from city to city:  
ἐστασίαζέ τε οὖν τὰ τῶν πόλεων, καὶ τὰ ἐφυστερίζοντά που πύστει τῶν 
προγενοµένων πολὺ ἐπέφερε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ καινοῦσθαι τὰς διανοίας τῶν τ᾽ 
                                                                                                                                                       
“The chapter should be excised” (Hornblower, 489 n.84). Indeed, 3.84’s presentation of stasis as 
being instigated by the lower classes rising up against their aristocratic abusers seems quite 
different from the more complex manipulations of the citizen body by party leaders that 
Thucydides outlines in the chapters preceding 3.84. On the other hand, Thucydides is not 
immune to self-contradiction.  
61 Certainly, there is also the Spartan didactic system, but this does not receive as much focus in 
the History as that of the Athenians.  
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ἐπιχειρήσεων περιτεχνήσει καὶ τῶν τιµωριῶν ἀτοπίᾳ. καὶ τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν 
τῶν ὀνοµάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει.  
 
And so the cities began to be disturbed by revolutions, and those that fell to this 
state later, on hearing of what had been done before, carried to still more 
extravagant lengths the invention of new devices, both by the extreme ingenuity 
of their attacks and the monstrousness of their revenges. The ordinary acceptation 
of words in their relation to things was changed as men thought fit.    
(3.8262)  
 
Stasis progresses geographically because it produces a widespread fervor for revolution 
throughout cities in Greece. It also progresses intellectually in that the knowledge (pustis) of 
previous staseis produces a flourishing of diagnoia for new ways to maim and murder others 
(peritechnêsis), as if the new stasis were vying with the old, in order to reach a new height of 
atrocity. The widespread appeal of stasis can be attributed to linguistic kinêsis, the radical change 
in how citizens in stasis evaluate the customary meanings of words:63  
What used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as 
the courage one would expect to find in a party member; to think of the future and 
wait was merely another way of saying one was a coward; any idea of moderation 
was just an attempt to disguise one’s unmanly character; ability to understand a 
question from all sides meant that one was totally unfitted for action. 
 
Violations of civic custom64 are justified and enabled by the violation of linguistic custom (τὴν 
εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνοµάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν, 3.82.4): “...neither [party] had any 
regard for true piety, yet those who could carry through an odious deed under the cloak of a 
specious phrase received the higher praise” (εὐσεβείᾳ µὲν οὐδέτεροι ἐνόµιζον, εὐπρεπείᾳ δὲ 
                                                
62 C.F. Smith, 144-5.  
63 “The point… is not that the meanings of words actually changed, as in George Orwell’s 
Nineteen Eighty-Four, but that the use which people made of the available descriptions changed 
as their evaluation of the relevant actions changed” (Hornblower, 483 n.4). 
64  “These parties were not formed to enjoy the benefits of the established laws, but to acquire 
power by overthrowing the existing regime” (καὶ τὰς ἐς σφᾶς αὐτοὺς πίστεις οὐ τῷ θείῳ νόµῳ 
µᾶλλον ἐκρατύνοντο ἢ τῷ κοινῇ τι παρανοµῆσαι, 3.82.6*).  
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λόγου οἷς ξυµβαίη ἐπιφθόνως τι διαπράξασθαι, ἄµεινον ἤκουον, 3.82.865). Thus, logoi are 
fundamental to the sustenance of stasis; the “specious phrase,” for example, is so highly valued 
because it perpetuates the illusion that nomoi are being upheld by the revolutionaries.  
While speeches that glorify stasis with words of praise are valued, voices of dissent are 
regarded with suspicion: “Anyone who held violent opinions could always be trusted, but anyone 
who objected to them became suspect” (καὶ ὁ µὲν χαλεπαίνων πιστὸς αἰεί, ὁ δ᾽ ἀντιλέγων αὐτῷ 
ὕποπτος, 3.82**). These dissenters, antilegontes, are heretical because they threaten to shatter 
the illusion of justice that linguistic kinêsis has facilitated. When Thucydides tells us that “it 
was…praiseworthy…to denounce someone who had no intention of doing any wrong at all,” we 
can imagine that the antilegontes were among these innocents (3.82*).  Since neutral parties, 
moderate parties, and voices of opposition are denounced or killed-off, societies in stasis become 
ideologically homologized to violent opinions. Stasis becomes a closed intellectual system in 
which even the father-son bond fails to wrench minds from the teachings of the biaios 
didaskalos. Indeed, the image of fathers killing sons described at 3.81.5 was most likely a true 
occurrence in the Hellenic staseis, but it is also an archetypal image that marks the end of 
Hellenic customs being passed down from father to son.  
 Thucydides concludes his record of the Corcyraean stasis with an image of Eurymedon, 
the Athenian general, and his fleet sailing away from the carnage-in-process on Corcyra, where 
they had stood by for seven days without intervening. Eurymedon’s inactivity has cast the 
general in considerable disrepute. Gomme writes: “the implication is that Eurymedon was, to this 
extent, responsible for the massacre, that with sixty ships he could have done what Nikostratos 
[the previous general stationed at Corcyra, whom Eurymedon presumably relieved] did with 
twelve, but took no trouble to interfere” (Gomme, 369 n.4). Hornblower adds: “The facts speak 
                                                
65 C.F. Smith, 149.  
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for themselves, and Th. does not need to comment on Eurymedon’s behaviour in standing by 
during the massacre” (Hornblower, 476 n.4). While I agree that “the facts speak for themselves,” 
I cannot agree that they condemn Eurymedon. Thucydides has already shown us Nicostratus’ 
failed attempt to arrange a settlement between the parties on Corcyra. But after the parties had 
reached a settlement and signed treaties, the Corcyraean democrats immediately began to 
sabotage the oligarchs (3.75). On Corcyra, unbridled acts of violence and breaches of trust are 
already in the process of being codified into nomos: healthy deliberative functions of the mind 
are decried as cowardice, while blind aggression and mental calculation insofar as it is used to 
harm another are now considered good behavior.66 Thus, with the Corcyraean stasis further 
underway, Eurymedon would have had even less of a chance than did Nicostratus to persuade the 
Corcyraeans to adopt a better way of life. As Athenian medical technê had met aporia in 
attempting to combat the plague,67 so Periclean paideusis meets aporia in attempting to recivilize 
the Corcyraean revolutionaries. Both of these events prove to be beyond the ability of the 






                                                
66 “What used to be described as a thoughtless act of aggression was now regarded as the courage 
one would expect to find in a party member; to think of the future and wait was merely another 
way of saying one was a coward; any idea of moderation was just an attempt to disguise one's 
unmanly character; ability to understand a question from all sides meant that one was totally 
unfitted for action” (3.82*).  
 
67 “At the beginning the doctors were quite incapable of treating the disease because of their 
ignorance of the right methods…Nor was any other human art or science of any help at all” (οὔτε 
γὰρ ἰατροὶ ἤρκουν τὸ πρῶτον θεραπεύοντες ἀγνοίᾳ… οὔτε ἄλλη ἀνθρωπεία τέχνη οὐδεµία, 
2.47*).  
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Conclusion: Intellectual Freedom  
 
 In Chapter 1, we began by looking at how Thucydides challenges the heroic narratives of 
the past, by showing that power (dunamis), rather than ethics, shaped the prehistoric world (1.2). 
We then turned to the Epidamnian narrative, Thucydides’ first real-time study of 5th-century 
Greek history, and saw that ethics were only of concern to political parties insofar as they could 
be manipulated to gain a political advantage. In Chapter 2, we transitioned from this geopolitical 
study of dunamis as the ultimate truth of politics, to the tensions created by the fact that the 
Athenians have an empire that they desperately wish to be perceived as just, yet are unwilling to 
yield, in any respect, the stranglehold that they have on their empire. To sustain both their 
ideology and their dunamis simultaneously, the mentality of the Athenians slides into denial: 
logoi and erga drift apart, as though the Athenians believe that their ideals dictate their public 
image, not their power. Such idealism results in the Athenians producing several ill-conceived 
political maneuvers that backfire by furthering their tyrannical public image. In Chapter 3, we 
see the divide between logoi and erga widen to a blatant and irreconcilable degree on the 
battlefields of 428-427: Thucydides shows us that neither the Athenians nor the Spartans are, in 
practice, able to live up to the national virtues that they had proclaimed for themselves in Books 
1 and 2. The ultimate irreconcilability between logoi and erga occurs in the Hellenic staseis, the 
first of which occurred in Corcyra in 427, the very same year in which national virtues collapsed 
openly on the battlefield. Stasis is militant idealism gone rogue; revolutionaries all too readily 
adapt to the violent erga of their world brought about by the biaios didaskalos. Once acclimated, 
however, they cease to name atrocities as such, but glorify them with new logoi. In this way, 
stasis synthesizes, or closes, the widening divide between logoi and erga that Thucydides has 
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shown progressively increasing from Books 1-3 by codifying the harsh and horrible erga of war 
into becoming new civic nomoi (3.82.4).  
 This project has aimed to demonstrate how ideologies at a remove from reality are 
harmful for the Athenians and, more broadly, for the character of the Greek world itself, because 
of the proliferation of stasis. Now, I would like to consider what this means for intellectual 
freedom and for history as a means of bestowing intellectual freedom: 
ἐν µὲν γὰρ εἰρήνῃ καὶ ἀγαθοῖς πράγµασιν αἵ τε πόλεις καὶ οἱ ἰδιῶται ἀµείνους τὰς 
γνώµας ἔχουσι διὰ τὸ µὴ ἐς ἀκουσίους ἀνάγκας πίπτειν: ὁ δὲ πόλεµος ὑφελὼν τὴν 
εὐπορίαν τοῦ καθ᾽ ἡµέραν βίαιος διδάσκαλος καὶ πρὸς τὰ παρόντα τὰς ὀργὰς τῶν 
πολλῶν ὁµοιοῖ.  
 
For in peace and prosperity both states and individuals have gentler feelings, 
because men are not then forced to face conditions of dire necessity; but war, 
which robs men of the easy supply of their daily wants, is a rough schoolmaster 
and creates in most people a temper that matches their condition.   
         
(3.8268) 
 
War drags the human mind into violence. In the History, Thucydides illuminates the descent of 
the mind to violence under the teachings of the biaios didaskalos. When we read Thucydides’ 
brief description of how he conducted his interviews, however, we realize that his 
contemporaries did not usually speak about the war with such brutal honesty: “Not that even the 
truth was easy to discover: different eye-witnesses give different accounts of the same events, 
speaking out of partiality for one side or the other or else from imperfect memories” (1.22*). 
Thucydides tells us that his sources spoke from eunomia or a very partial mnêmê. By 
implication, few of Thucydides’ sources seem to have conveyed the whole truth of events as they 
actually occurred.  Do we, for example, believe that once the Corcyraean democrats had 
prevailed over the oligarchs by slaughtering them out of pure malice (4.47-8), they would have 
                                                
68 C.F. Smith, 143.  
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told of the Corcyraean stasis the way that Thucydides tells it? Certainly not—revolutionaries 
would be the least likely to tell the truth, since their atrocities had been codified into nomos.  
Thucydides viewed internal revolution as a great threat to historical truth. The myth of 
the revolutionaries Harmodius and Aristogeiton exemplifies Thucydides’ claim that most 
people’s search for the truth is without pain.69 Indeed, at the beginning of the History, 
Thucydides uses a similar terminology to express his History’s eternal use that closely resembles 
his description of the eternal recurrence of stasis: 70 
… however many people will wish to see the clear image of both the things 
having happened and that are likely at some point again in accordance with the 
human condition to be resembling such things [as I have described], it will be 
abundantly useful to judge it.   
 
ὅσοι δὲ βουλήσονται τῶν τε γενοµένων τὸ σαφὲς σκοπεῖν καὶ τῶν µελλόντων 
ποτὲ αὖθις κατὰ τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τοιούτων καὶ παραπλησίων ἔσεσθαι, ὠφέλιµα 




Amidst the horror of war, linguistic kinêsis facilitates the ultimate denial of reality by reforming 
reality through language. In this way, stasis enables people to escape from the horror of war by 
rephrasing it in a way that makes war’s horrors seem noble or at least respectable. 
It requires considerable willpower, a moral steeliness, to wish to see things as they actually are 
(hosoi boulêsontai skopein to saphes). The Athenian reaction to the news of their defeat in Sicily 
                                                
69 οὕτως ἀταλαίπωρος τοῖς πολλοῖς ἡ ζήτησις τῆς ἀληθείας (1.20.3). 
70 Thucydides on the recurrence of stasis: “And so there fell upon the cities on account of 
revolutions many grievous calamities, such as happen and always will happen while human 
nature is the same, but which are severer or milder, and different in their manifestations, 
according as the variations in circumstances present themselves in each case” (καὶ ἐπέπεσε 
πολλὰ καὶ χαλεπὰ κατὰ στάσιν ταῖς πόλεσι, γιγνόµενα µὲν καὶ αἰεὶ ἐσόµενα, ἕως ἂν ἡ αὐτὴ φύσις 
ἀνθρώπων ᾖ, µᾶλλον δὲ καὶ ἡσυχαίτερα καὶ τοῖς εἴδεσι διηλλαγµένα, ὡς ἂν ἕκασται αἱ 
µεταβολαὶ τῶν ξυντυχιῶν ἐφιστῶνται, 3.82.2 Trans. C.F. Smith).  
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exemplifies this difficulty (8.1). Rather than face the truth, the Athenians blame the seers and 
politicians who had advocated for the Sicilian Expedition.  
In Twilight of the Idols, Nietzsche praises Thucydides for his “Courage in the face of 
reality,” and criticizeS Plato for his flight into the realm of idealism.71 While Thucydides is 
certainly worthy of our admiration, it is important that we not adopt the Nietzschean view too 
heartily, that the realism of the History is a product of Thucydides’ heroic temperament. It must 
be remembered that Thucydides was a disgraced Athenian general, banished from his homeland 
by the very Athenians whom he was supposed to defend. He was forced to watch, from afar, as 
the Athenian democracy destroyed itself—democracy, the intellectual milieu in which the 
historian himself was raised. Perhaps not a truth crusader by nature but merely a realist, we ought 
to view Thucydides as a truth crusader by necessity, a bitter and disillusioned man trying to 
reconcile ideals of civic virtue with the harsh realities of war and its effect upon civilization.  
 Nevertheless, Thucydides had courage. Not only did he face the investigative difficulties 
in the writing-up of the war, but also the emotional difficulty, we can imagine, in recording its 
atrocities without gods and without much redemption. Thucydides tells us at the beginning of the 
History that he was expecting that the Peloponnesian War would be a “great” and “noteworthy” 
war.72 These words become almost parodic, a flirtation with eunoia, a taste of how the war could 
                                                
71 “Courage in the face of reality ultimately distinguishes such natures as Thucydides and Plato: 
Plato is a coward in the face of reality—consequently he flees into the ideal; Thucydides has 
himself under control—consequently he has control over things…”  (Twilight of the Idols, 118). 
 
 
72 Θουκυδίδης Ἀθηναῖος ξυνέγραψε τὸν πόλεµον τῶν Πελοποννησίων καὶ Ἀθηναίων, ὡς 
ἐπολέµησαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους, ἀρξάµενος εὐθὺς καθισταµένου καὶ ἐλπίσας µέγαν τε ἔσεσθαι καὶ 
ἀξιολογώτατον τῶν προγεγενηµένων, τεκµαιρόµενος ὅτι ἀκµάζοντές τε ᾖσαν ἐς αὐτὸν 
ἀµφότεροι παρασκευῇ τῇ πάσῃ καὶ τὸ ἄλλο Ἑλληνικὸν ὁρῶν ξυνιστάµενον πρὸς ἑκατέρους, τὸ 
µὲν εὐθύς, τὸ δὲ καὶ διανοούµενον (1.1).  
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have been written-up by those who “order [their narratives] toward the greater” (ἐπὶ τὸ µεῖζον 
κοσµοῦντες, 1.21). 
It seems to me that the History’s endless paradoxes and perpetual contradictions are also 
a product of the courage that Nietzsche perceived in Thucydides: Thucydides does not allow his 
reader to wholeheartedly adopt any singular viewpoint presented within the History—not even 
his own. Although Thucydides vocally stands behind Pericles and Nicias, his narrative presents 
facts contrary to their words, and his own. Is Thucydides praising Pericles from eunoia? And 
why is Thucydides so critical of Cleon, when it is Cleon who perceives the erga of life most 
readily? These are the questions that come to mind from a reading of the History.  
“Someone taking into consideration the information which I have gone through would 
not err”  (τις νοµίζων µάλιστα ἃ διῆλθον οὐχ ἁµαρτάνοι, 1.21). The effect of Thucydides’ 
intellectual rigor in compiling the History is to not allow his reader to slide into intellectual 
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